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“It is clear to anyone willing to face reality that the only reason 
Saddam took the risk of refusing to submit his activities to U.N. 
inspectors was that he is exerting every muscle to build WMD.” 
—Margaret Thatcher, June 17, 20021 
“We have yet to see a smoking gun that would convict Tehran.” 
—International Atomic Energy Agency Director 
Mohammed ElBaradei, February 21, 20052 
Introduction 
The Iraq war rekindled debate—debate now further inflamed in dis-
cussions of Iran and North Korea—about the legal use of force to disarm 
an adversary state believed to pose a threat of catastrophic attack, includ-
ing with weapons of mass destruction (WMD).3 Coinciding with this 
debate is the stark fact that intelligence about allegedly hostile states’ 
WMD4 capabilities is and will remain limited. Assessments of WMD 
arsenals and programs are prone to errors of the sort exemplified by for-
mer British Prime Minister Thatcher’s comment, and often cannot be 
proven (or disproven) to the level of certainty invoked by International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director ElBaradei. 
How should international legal doctrine on the use of force handle 
this intelligence problem?  
One pole of the current use-of-force debate, most notably represented 
by the George W. Bush administration, defends unilateral decisions to use 
self-defensive force in the face of perceived WMD threats “even if uncer-
tainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack” (the 
“unilateralist view.”)5 The other pole holds that states cannot resort to force 
absent U.N. Security Council authorization unless attacked first, except 
                                                                                                                      
 1. Margaret Thatcher, Op-Ed., Don’t Go Wobbly, Wall St. J., June 17, 2002, at A18. 
 2. Erich Follath & Georg Mascolo, Auch al-Qaida will die Bombe [Al-Qaida also 
Wants the Bomb], Der Spiegel, Feb. 21, 2005, at 116. 
 3. For a general discussion of the strategic issues for U.S. policy, see generally 
Daniel Byman & Matthew Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign 
Policy and the Limits of Military Might 201–25 (2002). 
 4. For the purposes of this paper, I am primarily concerned with nuclear and viral-
biological weapons, i.e., those capable of imposing catastrophic damage. The nature of 
biological weapons threats differs significantly from that of nuclear weapons, and so therefore 
do strategies for combating these threats. See Christopher F. Chyba, Toward Biological 
Security, 8 Foreign Aff. 122, 122 (2002). 
 5. The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States 
of America 15 (Sept. 2002) [hereinafter National Security Strategy]. 
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perhaps in very narrow circumstances where a specifically identified 
attack is “imminent” (the “traditional view”).6  
These schools share a belief that the proliferation of WMD poses 
new challenges for international use of force rules, but they draw oppo-
site conclusions. Those taking the unilateralist view believe that the 
instantaneity and destructiveness of WMD threats render traditional 
rules, especially an imminence requirement, too stringent.7 States cannot 
be expected to bear the risk of a first strike while the U.N. Security 
Council deliberates, perhaps without end. Those taking the traditional 
view believe that the spread of WMD raises the danger of too lenient a 
standard for precautionary use of force. In their view relaxing the stan-
dard opens the door to masked aggression and may spur states to pursue 
WMD as deterrents or may create security instabilities among them.8 
Within this polarized debate exists a third view, which I develop fur-
ther and defend: the objective “reasonable necessity” approach holds that 
the use of force against another state believed to pose a WMD threat is 
justified when a reasonable state would conclude a WMD threat is suffi-
ciently likely and severe that forceful measures are necessary.9  
Events since the 2003 Iraq invasion have exposed a problem for all 
three approaches, but especially the reasonable necessity approach: 
whether or not a state has a WMD arsenal, or nearly has one, often can-
not be determined to a high degree of certainty. For example, U.S. 
intelligence assessments of all three “Axis of Evil” states’ WMD capa-
bilities contained major errors or uncertainties. Pre-war assessments that 
Iraq had stockpiled chemical or biological weapons and was building a 
nuclear bomb proved erroneous.10 Claims that Iran is racing towards a 
weaponized nuclear capability have been called into question by a 2007 
National Intelligence Council assessment.11 Even after North Korea 
tested a nuclear weapon in 2006, questions remain about whether it has a 
plutonium program, a uranium program, or both.12 
This Article argues that the most difficult future crises for which this 
legal debate is most consequential will not resemble those described by 
Prime Minister Thatcher or Director ElBaradei. Rather, in confronting 
potentially hostile and aggressive states believed to pose a WMD threat, 
                                                                                                                      
 6. For an excellent summary of this debate, see Sean D. Murphy, The Doctrine of 
Preemptive Self-Defense, 50 Vill. L. Rev. 699 (2005) (outlining four schools of thought, 
which he labels “strict-constructionist,” “imminent threat,” “qualitative threat,” and “charter-
is-dead”). 
 7. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 8. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 9. See infra Part II.A.3. 
 10. See infra notes 66–69. 
 11. See infra notes 70–72. 
 12. See infra notes 73–74. 
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decisionmakers contemplating the use of force will face an intelligence 
picture that is open to reasonable debate (contra Thatcher) and irresolv-
able to high levels of certainty (contra ElBaradei). This paper examines 
how competing legal approaches deal with this epistemic problem. 
If the threat of attack is a function of an adversary’s intentions and 
its capabilities, this epistemic problem represents a conceptual and prac-
tical shift from the challenges that the anticipatory self-defense rules and 
the U.N. Charter were each developed to handle. In the past, the key 
question was generally whether an adversary intended to attack.13 Mili-
tary capabilities could be assumed or assessed with a high level of 
certainty, but the community of states needed rules or processes for ad-
judicating whether uncertain intentions warranted forceful preemptive or 
anticipatory responses.14 Crises involving WMD-seeking rogue states 
pose uncertainty of both factors, and often the mere crossing (or per-
ceived crossing) of the WMD capability threshold has dire and sudden 
security and stability consequences.15 This Article argues that a sound 
legal doctrinal approach must be able to operate effectively in that envi-
ronment. 
The unilateralist school deals with capability uncertainty with a sub-
jective, or self-determined standard: the state contemplating the use of 
force to head off a WMD threat must believe in good faith that the use of 
force is necessary to forestall it.16 This school accepts as inevitable that 
states must and will make critical decisions amid substantial uncertainty. 
The traditional school deals with capability uncertainty with process.17 It 
argues that because accurately discerning a state’s capability is difficult, 
the international community should rely on collective decisionmaking, 
based as much as possible on assessments by international inspection 
and oversight organizations like the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) to determine the magnitude of threats. The reasonable necessity 
school proposes, usually through a combination of state practice and in-
                                                                                                                      
 13. See Thomas M. Franck, Recourse to Force: State Action Against Threats 
and Armed Attacks 97–108 (2002). 
 14. See Jack S. Levy, Misperception and the Causes of War: Theoretical Linkages and 
Analytical Problems, 36 World Pol. 76, 96 (1983) (“Statesmen have always recognized that 
intentions are more difficult to assess than capabilities.”).  
 15. One might object to the use of the term “uncertainty” here, preferring instead the 
term “risk.” Generally “risk” refers to situations where probabilities can be assigned to various 
possible outcomes, whereas “uncertainty” refers to situations where outcomes can be identi-
fied but probabilities cannot be assigned to them. See Cass R. Sunstein, Worst-Case 
Scenarios 146–47 (2007). Although estimating WMD capabilities may be thought of, strictly 
speaking, in terms of risk, I prefer the term “uncertainty” for its other sense, connoting factual 
ambiguity. 
 16. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 17. See infra Part II.B.1. 
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ternational institutional adjudication, flexible yet objective criteria to 
guide decisionmaking about military force.18 
This Article aims to develop more fully how an objective reason-
ableness approach to WMD capability assessments would work, and 
more generally how the law governing use of force should guide capabil-
ity assessments. It begins in Part I with an analysis of the debate over the 
international law regulating uses of force and the way each doctrinal 
camp purports to operate in a world of WMD proliferation. Part II argues 
that a key challenge for any doctrinal approach will be inevitable uncer-
tainty about adversaries’ WMD capability, and then examines how each 
approach grapples with the epistemic problem of judging such capability 
amid informational gaps and distortions. It argues that a reasonable ne-
cessity approach to use of force against WMD threats—and with it an 
objective standard of assessing WMD capability—operating as a narrow 
exception to formal U.N. Security Council authorization, best balances 
competing risks in an environment of significant capability uncertainty. 
However, it also argues that U.N. Security Council-driven processes and 
an objective necessity approach are not mutually exclusive and can be 
combined in reciprocally reinforcing ways. 
An objective necessity approach prompts the questions: what level 
of certainty is reasonable, and what evidentiary logic and assumptions 
should guide that judgment? Part III explores these questions, and re-
veals how evidentiary principles reflect underlying policy choices about 
balancing risks and combating proliferation. Even if one remains uncon-
vinced by the objective necessity approach, the evidentiary issues raised 
in Part III—and forced to the surface through objective reasonableness 
analysis—are critical to the effective operation of the legal processes 
advocated by the traditional view and its strict construction of the U.N. 
Charter.  
I. Use of Force Doctrine and Weapons 
of Mass Destruction 
International law on the use of force has traditionally allowed states 
some leeway to defend themselves without having to suffer a first blow. 
How much leeway is allowed is the source of much debate, and this de-
bate has intensified as WMD proliferate. This Part charts that debate, and 
then adds to it the emergent reality that states contemplating the use of 
force are often unable to assess with great confidence whether or not an 
adversary truly has, or is about to acquire, a WMD arsenal. 
                                                                                                                      
 18. See infra Part II.B.3. 
WAXMAN FTP 3_C.DOC 11/13/2009  9:18 AM 
6 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 31:1 
 
A. Use of Force and Anticipatory Self-Defense 
The international legal doctrine of anticipatory self-defense regulates 
the use of military force against attacks that have not yet occurred.19 The 
classic formulation of the doctrine was articulated by Secretary of State 
Daniel Webster in an 1841 exchange with his British counterparts.20 Brit-
ish forces attacked the schooner Caroline in U.S. territory because they 
expected it to ferry supplies across the border to Canada in aid of rebels 
who were fighting the British rule. Webster objected, arguing that a right 
of anticipatory self-defense arises only when there is a necessity of self-
defense that is “instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, 
and no moment for deliberation.”21 To those who accept its continuing 
validity in the modern era, anticipatory self-defense is a narrow excep-
tion to the general U.N. Charter rule that armed force against another 
state is prohibited unless authorized by the U.N. Security Council or, 
once a state has been militarily attacked, in self-defense.22 
I say “to those who accept” the continuing validity of anticipatory 
self-defense because some scholars argue that the U.N. Charter 
deliberately overrode the rule and replaced it exclusively with collective 
self-defense mechanisms administered by the Security Council.23 Article 
51 of the U.N. Charter states: “Nothing in the present Charter shall 
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an 
armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the 
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international 
peace and security.”24 The strictest interpreters of this provision insist 
                                                                                                                      
 19. See Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the Pre-Emptive Use of Force: 
Afghanistan, Al-Qaida and Iraq, in Essays on War in International Law 667, 672–76 
(2006). 
 20. See Michael W. Doyle, Striking First: Preemption and Prevention in In-
ternational Conflict 11–15 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2008); Franck, supra note 13, at 
97–98. 
 21. Letter from Daniel Webster, U.S. Sec’y of State, to Lord Ashburton, British Pleni-
potentiary (Aug. 6, 1842), quoted in 2 John Bassett Moore, A Digest of International 
Law § 217, at 412 (1906). 
 22. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (discussing use of force generally); see also id. art. 51 
(discussing self-defense). For a discussion of minority views, see Murphy, supra note 6, at 
708–10. 
 23. See Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States 275–
76 (1963); Antonio Cassese, International Law 57 (2d ed. 2005); Christine Gray,  
International Law and the Use of Force 112 (2000); Louis Henkin, How Nations 
Behave: Law and Foreign Policy 141–44 (1979); Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Power 
and Purpose of International Law: Insights from the Theory and Practice of 
Enforcement 172–79 (2008); see also Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-
Defense 171–72 (3d ed. 2001) (arguing for a more limited right of “interceptive” self-defense 
when an armed attack is in progress but has not yet hit, such as Japanese vessels en route to 
bomb Pearl Harbor). 
 24. U.N. Charter art. 51. 
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that the phrase “if an armed attack occurs” was intended to eliminate the 
customary right of anticipatory self-defense.25 
The better view, upon which this paper is based, is that the “inherent 
right of self-defense” to which Article 51 refers also incorporates antici-
patory self-defense. The key debate concerns the conditions under which 
anticipatory self-defense may be invoked. The majority of scholars ac-
cept this general view, and state practice since 1945 reinforces it.26 
The basic policy behind international self-defense doctrine is to 
promote global order by permitting states sufficient leeway to respond to 
expected security threats while not creating an exception so broad to the 
baseline prohibition of force that it swallows the rule, or is used 
pretextually to mask aggression. Because the policy involves predicting 
future actions by an expected aggressor, application of the anticipatory 
self-defense doctrine, or what more broadly could be called the 
“precautionary self-defense” doctrine, risks false positives and false 
negatives. False positives are uses of military force in self-defense against 
expected attacks that would not have actually materialized. They are 
problematic because of their immediate destructive material and diplomatic 
effects, as well as their potential to escalate into a larger war or to create 
additional insecurity among other states. False negatives are abstentions 
from using self-defensive military force due to a mistaken assessment that 
an adversary would not attack first. They are problematic because they 
result in and reward preventable aggression. Anticipatory self-defense 
rules aim to calibrate the risk of false positives and false negatives.27 
The imminence requirement in traditional anticipatory self-defense 
doctrine can be understood as a legal device for reducing false positives, 
or unnecessary resorts to self-defensive force.28 Requiring that a specific 
attack be about to occur helps ensure that a defender exhaust other,  
non-forcible means, and it reduces the likelihood of mistakes, insofar as 
                                                                                                                      
 25. See, e.g., Brownlie, supra note 23, at 275–76; Gray, supra note 23, at 112; see 
also O’Connell, supra note 23, at 172–79 (advocating a restrictive interpretation of the 
“armed attack”-based self-defense exception of Article 51). 
 26. See Franck, supra note 13, at 107–08. Any such use of force is always limited by 
other international legal principles, including necessity and proportionality. See Louis Henkin, 
The Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in Right v. Might: International Law and the 
Use of Force 37, 45 (Louis Henkin et al. eds., 1991). 
 27. On the purposes underlying use of force rules and their interpretation as a means of 
balancing false positives and negatives, see W. Michael Reisman, Assessing Claims to Revise the 
Laws of War, 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 82, 83–84 (2003) (describing the International Court of Justice’s 
(ICJ) decision in Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27), as 
reflecting the Court’s effort to balance under-use versus over-use of military force).  
 28. See Franck, supra note 13, at 107 (“In the right circumstances, [anticipatory self-
defense] can be a prescient measure that, at low cost, extinguishes the fuse of a power-keg. In 
the wrong circumstances, it can cause the very calamity it anticipates.”). See generally Eric A. 
Posner & Alan O. Sykes, Optimal War and Jus Ad Bellum, 93 Geo. L.J. 993 (2005).  
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waiting until that point is more likely to expose an adversary’s true inten-
tions, perhaps through visible preparations. An imminence requirement 
therefore helps distinguish an adversary’s general attitude of hostility 
from a maturated intention to attack.29 
B. “Precautionary Self-Defense” and WMD 
The proliferation of WMD complicates the anticipatory self-defense 
debate because such technology raises the stakes of errors (of both kinds, 
but especially of false negatives). What sets WMD apart from other 
arsenals is their ability to inflict massive damage in a short period of 
time. An adversary with WMD may be able to strike with little or no 
notice, after which it may be too late to defend against the devastating 
impact. Moreover, a state’s mere possession of WMD allows it to wield a 
significant threat, radically expanding its ability to intimidate other states 
or international actors. It is in part for these reasons that the U.N. 
Security Council declared in Resolution 1540 that the “proliferation of 
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of 
delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security.”30  
1. The Security Context of WMD  
The problem of applying the anticipatory self-defense doctrine in a 
world of WMD proliferation is not a new one, but it has been exacer-
bated in recent years. As Rosalyn Higgins of the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) remarked about fifteen years ago, “in a nuclear age, com-
mon sense cannot require one to interpret an ambiguous provision in a 
text in a way that requires a state passively to accept its fate before it can 
defend itself.”31 And thirty years before that, in President Kennedy’s ad-
dress to the nation during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, he explained, 
We no longer live in a world where only the actual firing of 
weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nation’s security 
to constitute maximum peril. Nuclear weapons are so destructive 
and ballistic missiles are so swift, that any substantially in-
creased possibility of their use or any sudden change in their 
deployment may well be regarded as a definite threat to peace.32 
                                                                                                                      
 29. See generally Posner & Sykes, supra note 28, at 1000. 
 30. S.C. Res. 1540, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004). 
 31. Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We 
Use It 242 (1994). 
 32. President John F. Kennedy, Radio and Television Report to the American People on 
the Soviet Arms Buildup in Cuba (radio & television broadcast Oct. 22, 1962), available at 
http://www.jfklibrary.org/jfkl/cmc/j102262.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2009). 
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At the time Kennedy spoke, fewer than a half-dozen countries had, 
or were even developing, significant WMD capabilities.33 Today, how-
ever, an estimated nine countries already have nuclear weapons.34 There 
are at least seven other countries that have indicated an interest in nu-
clear weapons and are currently seeking to expand their nuclear energy 
programs.35 Meanwhile, an estimated eighteen countries now have, or are 
likely to have, chemical or biological weapons capabilities,36 and the ca-
pabilities of those states that are actively pursuing WMD programs will 
likely improve over the next decade. 
Suspected WMD arsenals dramatically alter the strategic calculus of 
potential target states. An adversary with WMD may be able to strike 
with little or no notice, foreclosing the possibility of diplomacy and 
other methods of conflict avoidance that are usually available in the con-
text of conventional war. Moreover, once a WMD attack is initiated, the 
targeted state is likely to have limited options for protecting its popula-
tion and strategic assets.37  
Beyond the concern of an actual attack, mere possession of a WMD 
capability by a hostile or aggressive state poses an array of dangers to 
other states. The WMD capability can serve as a powerful deterrent, af-
fording its wielder greater freedom to undertake aggressive military and 
diplomatic actions. WMD-armed states may be more tempted to employ 
conventional or asymmetric force to achieve goals given the diminished 
likelihood of military counteraction or unfavorable escalation.38 Both the 
                                                                                                                      
 33. See National Resources Defense Council, Nuclear Notebook: Global Nuclear 
Stockpiles, 1945–2006, 62 Bull. Atomic Scientists 64 (2006), available at http:// 
thebulletin.metapress.com/content/c4120650912x74k7/fulltext.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2009). 
 34. See Paul K. Kerr, CRS Report: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weap-
ons and Missiles: Status and Trends 6 (Feb. 20, 2008), available at http://www.fas.org/ 
sgp/crs/nuke/RL30699.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2009); see also Federation of American Scien-
tists, Status of World Nuclear Forces, http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/nukestatus.html 
(last visited Oct. 5, 2009).  
 35. See Comm’n on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism, 
World at Risk: The Report of the Commission on the Prevention of WMD 
Proliferation and Terrorism 61–62 (2008) [hereinafter Graham-Talent Report]; 
Council on Foreign Relations, Issue Brief: The Global Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime, 
www.cfr.org/publication/ 18984/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2009). 
 36. See Kerr, supra note 34, at 20.  
 37. Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the Pre-Emptive Use of Force: 
Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda, and Iraq, 4 San Diego Int’l L.J. 7, 16 (referring to the “impossibil-
ity for [a] State to afford its population any effective protection once the attack has been 
launched”). This fact also underlies much of the debate on Ballistic Missile Defense. See gen-
erally Ballistic Missile Defense (Ashton B. Carter & David N. Schwartz, eds., 1984); 
James M. Lindsay & Michael E. O’Hanlon, Defending America: The Case for Limited 
National Missile Defense (2001). 
 38. For a discussion of what political scientists often call this “stability-instability para-
dox,” see Glenn H. Snyder, The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror, in The Balance 
of Power and the Balance of Terror 184 (Paul Seabury ed., 1965). 
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WMD threat itself and this increase in the perceived utility of other vio-
lence can be used to intimidate other states and international actors.39  
The “profile” of proliferating states magnifies the risk of deterrence-
shielded aggression and additional proliferation once they develop 
WMD capabilities. These states likely violated international law 
throughout their development of WMD, and so are likely to feel rela-
tively unconstrained by norms governing both proliferation and the use 
of force.40 They are also quintessential “non status quo” states, in that 
they presumably sought their WMD capability out of dissatisfaction with 
the prior balance of power or international order.41  
WMD possession also raises the danger of further proliferation in 
several ways. First, states that are threatened by this new WMD capabil-
ity may attempt to acquire their own WMD as a deterrent, sparking arms 
races.42 Second, WMD development increases the risks that a state may 
share technology or materials with other states aspiring to attain WMD 
                                                                                                                      
 39. See James Steinberg, Preventive Force in US National Security Strategy, 47 Sur-
vival 55, 60 (2005). But see Richard K. Betts, Universal Deterrence or Conceptual Collapse? 
Liberal Pessimism and Utopian Realism, in The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, 
U.S. Interests, and World Order 51, 84 (Victor A. Utgoff ed., 2000) [hereinafter The 
Coming Crisis] (“Utopian realism [i.e., proliferation optimism as exemplified by Waltz] 
should not convince us to promote the spread of WMD, but it may hold out some hope if non-
proliferation fails.”); John J. Mearsheimer, The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent, 72 
Foreign Aff. 50, 51 (1993) (“[N]uclear proliferation sometimes promotes peace . . . .”); John 
J. Mearsheimer, Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War, Atlantic Monthly, Aug. 1990, at 
35, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/foreign/mearsh.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 
2009) (“[W]ell-managed proliferation could produce an order nearly as stable as that of the 
Long Peace.”); Scott Sagan et al., A Nuclear Iran: Promoting Stability or Courting Disaster, 
Colum. J. Int. Aff., Spring-Summer 2007, at 136–38 (citing Waltz’s comments). 
 40. See Byman & Waxman, supra note 3, at 204–07; see also infra notes 308–311 and 
accompanying text (discussing these correlations and the problem of cognitive biases in threat 
assessment). 
 41. See Lawrence Freedman, Prevention, Not Preemption, 26 Wash. Q. 105, 112–13 
(2003) (“Instead of a status quo, risk-averse adversary against whom deterrence might work, 
the United States now has gamblers for enemies . . . .”); Stephen M. Walt, Containing Rogues 
and Renegades: Coalition Strategies and Counterproliferation, in The Coming Crisis, supra 
note 39, at 191, 194–95 (“[V]irtually all analysts regard [rogue] regimes as fundamentally 
hostile to the United States. . . . [R]ogue states are assumed to have inherently revisionist 
aims, meaning that they seek to alter the status quo for reasons other than a desire to improve 
their own security.”). Walt thinks these assertions “should not be accepted uncritically” and 
gives more weight to the idea that “their aggressive behavior stems largely from insecurity 
rather than ideological conviction or a desire for glory or material gain,” but that a desire to 
obtain WMD in order to ameliorate feelings of insecurity does indicate dissatisfaction with the 
international balance of power. See id. at 196. 
 42. See Cong. Comm’n on Strategic Posture of the U.S., Interim Report 4 
(2008), available at http://www.usip.org/files/file/strategic_posture_commission_interim_ 
report.pdf (last visited Sept. 13, 2009) (“If Iran and North Korea proceed unchecked to build 
nuclear arsenals, there is a serious possibility of a cascade of proliferation following.”); Int’l 
Sec. Advisory Bd., Report on Discouraging a Cascade of Nuclear Weapons 
States (2007) available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/ISAB%20-%20Nuclear% 
20Cascade%20Report.pdf (last visited Sept. 13, 2009).  
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capability, or could even transfer technology, materials, or weapons to 
non-state actors.43  
2. WMD and Strains on “Imminence” 
The proliferation of WMD complicates the anticipatory self-defense 
debate by frustrating aspects of the traditional imminence formulation 
and raising the stakes of errors, especially false negatives.44 Once in the 
hands of a hostile state, WMD capabilities can pose threats that are very 
different from the class of threats out of which the imminence require-
ment—summed up so well in the Caroline exchange—grew. As a result, 
many scholars and policymakers have expressed concern that techno-
logical changes and WMD proliferation are outstripping traditional 
imminence doctrine.45  
Traditional imminence depends heavily on a temporal restriction, 
whereby force is only permitted “during the last window of opportunity.”46 
The technological nature of WMD and their delivery can make it 
impossible to discern this “last chance” period, limiting the extent to 
which the imminence requirement can be used to reduce uncertainty about 
a WMD-armed adversary’s true intentions. In a conventional context, a 
state’s decision to attack was usually accompanied by a perceptible 
mobilization of forces, while a WMD threat may only become imminent 
with the crystallization of the aggressor’s intention to attack.47 This 
                                                                                                                      
 43. See William J. Broad et al., A Tale of Nuclear Proliferation: How Pakistani Built 
His Network, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 2004, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2004/02/12/international/asia/12NUKE.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2009); David E. Sanger & 
William J. Broad, From Rogue Nuclear Programs, Web of Trails Leads to Pakistan, 
N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/04/international/04NUKE.html 
(last visited Oct. 6, 2009). 
 44. See Elizabeth Wilmshurst, Chatham House, Principles of International 
Law on the Use of Force by States in Self-Defense 9 (2005) (“While the possession of 
WMD without a hostile intent to launch an attack does not in itself give rise to a right of self-
defence, the difficulty of determining intent and the catastrophic consequences of making an 
error will be relevant factors in any determination of ‘imminence’. . . .”).  
 45. See, e.g., id. at 8; Doyle, supra note 20, at 11–17; National Security Strategy, 
supra note 5, at 15 (“We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and 
objectives of today’s adversaries.”); Greenwood, supra note 37, at 16; Abraham D. Sofaer, On 
the Necessity of Pre-emption, 14 Eur. J. Int’l L. 209 (2003); Terence Taylor, The End of 
Imminence? 27 Wash. Q. 57 (2004); Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks on the 
President’s National Security Strategy at the Waldorf-Astoria, (Oct. 1, 2002) (“[N]ew technol-
ogy requires new thinking about when a threat actually becomes ‘imminent’.”); see also 
Murphy, supra note 6, at 715–17 (discussing the “qualitative threat” school of thought). 
 46. Michael N. Schmitt, Counter-Terrorism and the Use of Force in International Law, 
2002 Isr. Y.B. Hum. Rts 53, 110. 
 47. Walter B. Slocombe, Force, Pre-Emption and Legitimacy, 45 Survival 117, 125 
(2003) (“The traditional concept of ‘imminence’ assumed a context where the need for mobili-
sation and other preparation meant that there was a realistic prospect of warning of an 
attack.”); Taylor, supra note 45, at 66. 
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vanishing of the intentions-signaling mobilization period, combined with 
these weapons’ catastrophic potential and the limits of protective means 
after an attack has commenced, severely restricts the opportunities for 
self-defense afforded by the traditional concept of imminence.  
As a related problem, the broader dangers of WMD possession be-
come “imminent” not immediately prior to a WMD attack, but before a 
state’s WMD program reaches a sufficient stage of development. Be-
cause these weapons can be used with little warning and are capable of 
causing extraordinary damage, any rational state would view their pos-
session by a hostile actor as a matter of grave concern.48 Additionally, 
mere possession can create serious collateral dangers, by acting as a 
shield for other forms of aggression and unfavorably altering the re-
gional security dynamic.49 All this effectively shifts a substantial portion 
of contemporary security risks outside the ambit of traditional immi-
nence, diminishing the self-defense value of following the principle. 
These types of complications for self-defense rules have generated 
widespread belief that legal doctrine, and the concept of imminence in 
particular, needs to be updated in light of contemporary threats such as 
the proliferation of WMD.50 While these changes in the threat environ-
ment by themselves do not compel the conclusion that self-defense rules 
need to be broadened (since one may believe such an expansion would 
create a greater countervailing danger of abuse), a range of experts have 
proposed remedial loosening of the traditionally understood imminence 
requirement.51 In the words of one such expert, 
[t]he right of anticipatory self-defence by definition presupposes 
a right to act while action is still possible. If waiting for “immi-
                                                                                                                      
 48. As Ivo Daalder observes, “the very possession of weapons of mass destruction by 
some countries can pose an existential threat, whether or not their actual use is truly immi-
nent.” Ivo H. Daalder, Beyond Preemption: An Overview, in Beyond Preemption 1, 8 (Ivo H. 
Daalder ed., 2007). 
 49. See Betts, supra note 39, at 61–62 (“Rational strategic reasons to want WMD in-
clude: to deter the use of WMD against one’s own country; to redress inferiority in 
conventional military capabilities by threatening to escalate in retaliation against an enemy’s 
conventional attack; and to coerce an adversary into political concessions.”); Barry Posen & 
Andrew L. Ross, Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy, 21 Int’l Security 5, 25 (1996) 
(arguing that because democracies are extremely casualty-sensitive, the risk of a nuclear attack 
even from a state with a very small nuclear arsenal can alter their behavior, and might even 
“discourage them from coming to the assistance of a country in trouble”); Sagan et al., supra 
note 39, at 139 (“[There is a] danger of nuclear weapons promoting aggression of the state 
which holds them—that is, acquiring the protection of a nuclear shield which will enable the 
state to be more aggressive in a conventional manner.”). 
 50. As Terence Taylor has warned, “[i]nternational law, by its inherently reactive na-
ture, risks evolving too slowly to define the proper response to this already apparent 
challenge.” Taylor, supra note 45, at 59. 
 51. See supra note 45.  
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nence” means waiting until it is no longer possible to act effec-
tively, the victim is left no alternative to suffering the first blow. 
So interpreted, the “right” would be illusory.52 
3. “Precautionary Self-Defense” 
One might immediately object to this previous discussion as conflat-
ing two concepts, preemptive (or anticipatory) and preventive force. 
Generally, preemption refers to the use of force to avert an expected at-
tack that is about to occur.53 An oft-cited example is Israel’s surprise 
strikes on its Arab neighbors in 1967, based on its professed belief that 
the Arab states were on the verge of attacking (although recent historical 
analysis has cast some doubt on the certainty and accuracy of those be-
liefs).54 Prevention refers to the use of force to avoid an emerging state of 
affairs in which a threat would be more likely or increasingly dire.55 An 
example is Israel’s 1981 attack on Iraq’s uncompleted Osiraq nuclear 
facility, based on the Israeli government’s belief that once Iraq had a nu-
clear weapons capability it would be in a strong position to threaten 
Israel.56 The main conceptual differences between the two concepts are 
temporal and speculative, or how imminent and concrete a threat must be 
to trigger self-defense rights.57 
For the purposes of this paper, I use the inclusive term “precaution-
ary self-defense” to denote the broad range of decisions to use force to 
forestall expected dangers before an actual attack. In other words, pre-
cautionary defense includes anticipatory defense (where specific attack 
is imminent), as well as a subset of preventive defense (where a specific 
attack may not be imminent but a grave security risk brought about by a 
hostile state’s capability development is likely).  
Especially in the WMD context, the lines between anticipatory, pre-
emptive, and preventive force tend to blur. Because WMD can often be 
                                                                                                                      
 52. Slocombe, supra note 47, at 125. Walter Slocombe was the Undersecretary of De-
fense for Policy during the Clinton administration. 
 53. See Rachel Bzostek, Why Not Preempt? Security, Law, Norms, and Antici-
patory Military Activities 9–23 (2008). 
 54. See Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the 
Modern Middle East 61–169 (2002). 
 55. See Bzostek, supra note 53, at 9–13; Doyle, supra note 20, at 25. 
 56. See Shai Feldman, The Bombing of Osiraq-Revisited, 7 Int’l Security 114, 114 
(1982). 
 57. See Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with His-
torical Illustrations 74–75 (2d ed. 1992); Dan Reiter, Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: 
Preemptive Wars Almost Never Happen, 20 Int’l Security 5, 6–7 (1995) (“A war is preemp-
tive if it breaks out primarily because the attacker feels that it will itself be the target of a 
military attack in the short term . . . . This definition is limited to perceptions of short-term 
threats to national security: in contrast, the term preventive war is used for a war that begins 
when a state attacks because it feels that in the longer term (usually the next few years) it will 
be attacked or will suffer relatively increasing strategic inferiority.”).  
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used without warning, the temporal proximity of a threat may be impos-
sible to determine objectively. As a result, it may become unworkable to 
distinguish clearly between “distant” and “imminent” threats, and so 
between prevention and preemption.58  
Moreover, all three legal approaches discussed implicitly contem-
plate the possibility of the preemptive or preventive use of force (that is, 
prior to the point of imminent attack).59 Their difference is in how to 
regulate legally that decisionmaking, and even more specifically how to 
measure a component of the necessary legal conditions (by requiring 
process versus good faith versus reasonableness assessments). This pa-
per does not advance a complete argument about the ultimate policy 
merits of preemptive and preventive uses of force, although it shows how 
the legal issues and policy issues are intertwined.60 Rather, it asks: If the 
legal regime were to permit uses of force against a hostile state under 
certain circumstances, how should those circumstances be judged, in 
light of emergent intelligence limitations?61  
Notice the important assumption of a “hostile” state. Of course, not 
all states—or even many states—with WMD exhibit sufficient hostile 
intentions to warrant forceful counter-action as a matter of law or policy. 
Indeed, I assume that those conditions will be quite rare. While the threat 
posed by a WMD-armed or WMD-arming state is a composite of its in-
tentions and its capabilities, this paper gives a deliberately incomplete 
treatment of a WMD threat’s legal appraisal by attempting to isolate the 
                                                                                                                      
 58. See Philip Bobbitt, Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty-First 
Century 447–48 (2008). But see Wilmshurst, supra note 44, at 9 (“To the extent that a 
doctrine of ‘pre-emption’ encompasses a right to respond to threats which have not yet crystal-
lized but which might materialise at some time in the future, such a doctrine (sometimes 
called ‘preventive defence’) has no basis in international law.”). 
 59. See The Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility: Re-
port of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, ¶ 190, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 
(Dec. 2, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 
2009) [hereinafter U.N. High-Level Panel] (taking the traditionalist view and stating that “if 
there are good arguments for preventive military action, with good evidence to support them, 
they should be put to the Security Council, which can authorize such action if it chooses to”). 
 60. See Slocombe, supra note 47, at 126–28, for a prudential case against preemptive 
use of force to deal with WMD threats. 
 61. As just explained, all three regulatory modes—process, subjective standard, and 
objective standard—theoretically permit precautionary force under certain circumstances. In 
practice, we can expect the process approach virtually always to be the least permissive, and 
the subjective the most permissive, because as one moves from subjective to objective to proc-
ess analysis, the latter will almost always include satisfaction of the former. That is, whenever 
a reasonable state would conclude that force is warranted (because of reasonable belief about 
requisite intent and capability), some single state or group of states contemplating the use of 
the force can also be expected to take that view in good faith. And whenever the process ap-
proach—i.e., through U.N. Security Council deliberation—would conclude that force is 
warranted, so too would a hypothesized reasonable state, or else it would be virtually impossi-
ble to achieve sufficient voting consensus in the Council. 
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capability assessment variable. To this end, I assume some requisite level 
of hostile or destabilizing intentions as viewed through the eyes of those 
states contemplating force in response. 
To be very clear, I am not arguing that WMD possession or pursuit 
alone is ever sufficient legal cause for precautionary force. Adversary 
capability or capability development is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition of legal precautionary force. This paper focuses on the capabil-
ity part of the equation, although some of the analytical principles and 
logic it explores could apply to intentions as well.  
C. The Problem of Intelligence Limitations 
A lesson of the past few decades—a lesson displayed dramatically in 
recent years—is that information about an adversary or rogue state’s 
WMD capability is often murky or incomplete. Intelligence assessments 
can turn out to be widely off-mark. A major challenge facing national 
security decisionmakers will likely be not what to do about a hostile 
adversary that has WMD, but what to do about a hostile adversary that 
might have WMD.  
The most obvious example of this problem is Iraq, although there are 
other examples from both before and after the 2003 invasion, and 
examples of both overestimating and underestimating WMD capabilities. 
Israel’s 1981 assessment before it bombed Osiraq that Iraq was very 
close to achieving an operational nuclear arsenal was refuted by after-
the-fact analyses.62 Following the 1991 Gulf War, the United States and 
the international community more broadly discovered that they had 
vastly underestimated Iraq’s progress toward a nuclear weapon 
capability.63 In 1998 the United States government was caught off-guard 
by India’s test of a nuclear weapon,64 followed quickly by Pakistan’s.65 
The embarrassing failure to find WMD in Iraq led to the 
appointment of an executive-mandated investigatory commission, the 
Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States 
Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD Commission), co-
chaired by former Judge Laurence Silberman and former Senator 
Charles Robb.66 With regard to Iraq, the Commission concluded that the 
                                                                                                                      
 62. See Richard K. Betts, The Osirak Fallacy, Nat’l Int., Spring 2006, at 22. 
 63. David A. Kay, Denial and Deception Practices of WMD Proliferators: Iraq and 
Beyond, 18 Wash. Q., Winter 1995, at 85.  
 64. See Strobe Talbott, Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb 
2–3 (2004). 
 65. See Dexter Filkins, Pakistan Explodes 5 Nuclear Devices in Response to India, L.A. 
Times, May 29, 1998, at A1. 
 66. See Douglas Jehl, Bush Sets Panel on Intelligence Before Iraq War, N.Y. Times, 
Feb. 7, 2004, at A1. 
WAXMAN FTP 3_C.DOC 11/13/2009  9:18 AM 
16 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 31:1 
 
Bush administration did not deliberately manipulate intelligence but that 
the intelligence system itself produced a faulty assessment.67 More 
broadly, it concluded that U.S. and international capabilities to detect 
and accurately assess WMD capabilities are, and will remain, limited.68 
Another major study concluded that “[i]n the Iraqi case, arguably the 
three best intelligence services in the world—those of the United States, 
Great Britain, and Israel—proved tragically unequal to the task” of 
providing accurate intelligence on emerging threats.69 
Controversy currently surrounds Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons de-
velopment program.70 In his February 2005 State of the Union Address, 
President Bush declared that, “[t]oday, Iran . . . [is] pursuing nuclear 
weapons,” but a November 2007 National Intelligence Estimate con-
cluded that, at the time, Iran’s enrichment program did not have a 
military dimension but that Iran could develop military nuclear capabili-
ties in the near future.71 Debates continue within intelligence 
communities about Iran’s nuclear capabilities and ambitions, yet as 
IAEA Director ElBaradei reminds us, “[w]e have yet to see a smoking 
gun that would convict Tehran.”72  
Even in the case of North Korea, now a confirmed nuclear power, 
huge questions remain concerning the nature and scope of its WMD pro-
gram.73 North Korea conducted a plutonium-based nuclear test in 2006, 
even after which American intelligence agencies reportedly admitted 
                                                                                                                      
 67. See The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States 
Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report to the President of the United 
States 3, 51 (2005), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/wmd/report/wmd_report.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 5, 2009) [hereinafter WMD Commission Report]. 
 68. See id. at 517. 
 69. Joseph Cirincione et al., Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications 61 (2004), available at http:// 
www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Iraq3FullText.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2009).  
 70. See Graham-Talent Report, supra note 35, at 62, 63 (“[O]n September 29, 2008, 
IAEA Director General ElBaradei [noted that there is an] ‘. . . absence of full clarity about 
Iran’s past and present nuclear program.’”). This uncertainty about the status of an Iranian 
nuclear weapons program has been ongoing for almost a decade. Id. at 62. 
 71. See Nat’l Intelligence Council, National Intelligence Estimate, Iran: 
Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities (2007), available at http://www.dni.gov/press_ 
releases/20071203_release.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2009).  
 72. Karen DeYoung & Michael D. Shear, U.S., Allies Say Iran Has Secret Nuclear 
Facility, Wash. Post, Sept. 26, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/09/25/AR2009092500289.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2009) (reporting 
recent disclosures by the Iran); Follath & Mascolo, supra note 2; see also George Jahn, Nuke 
Agency Says Iran Can Make Bomb, Assoc. Press, Sept. 17, 2009, available at http:// 
news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090917/ap_on_re_eu/eu_iran_nuclear (last visited Oct. 5, 2009) (dis-
cussing intelligence assessments of Iran’s nuclear program). 
 73. Staff of H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, Subcomm. on Intel-
ligence Pol’y, Recognizing North Korea as a Strategic Threat: An Intelligence 
Challenge for the United States 5, 6 (2005), available at http://intelligence.house.gov/ 
Media/PDFS/NorthKoreaReport092806.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2009). 
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serious doubts about the sophistication, competence, and even existence 
of a parallel North Korea’s uranium enrichment program.74 
The problem of capability uncertainty is not going away anytime 
soon, and it may grow.75 There are several reasons why these existing 
information gaps about WMD capabilities and programs will not be sub-
stantially closed. These include systemic intelligence deficiencies, 
inspection and verification weaknesses, the nature of modern WMD 
technologies, and concealment efforts by proliferators.76 
National intelligence systems are insufficient to meet expanding 
demands in this area.77 While there have been a number of commissions 
and studies dedicated to improving intelligence related to WMD 
proliferation, even the most positive assessments conclude that the 
demands will be difficult to meet,78 and most estimations conclude that 
major intelligence lapses are virtually inevitable.79  
                                                                                                                      
 74. See David E. Sanger & William J. Broad, U.S. Concedes Uncertainty on Korean Ura-
nium Effort, N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 2007, at A1 (reporting that while the intelligence community’s 
initial assessment based on North Korea’s purchase of some twenty centrifuges from Pakistan 
was still factually correct, nothing had taken place since the sale to further corroborate North 
Korea’s desire to use the centrifuges to develop a vast uranium enrichment program). 
 75. See Daniel H. Joyner, International Law and the Proliferation of Weap-
ons of Mass Destruction 289 (2009). 
 76. See supra notes 66–74; infra notes 77–97. 
 77. See, e.g., WMD Commission Report, supra note 67, at 297–98 (“[A]gencies hav-
ing responsibility for WMD terrorism are also understaffed, and the few experts that do exist 
are suffering from burnout.”); Graham-Talent Report, supra note 35, at 97 (“Because of 
attrition and hiring freezes during the 1990s, there are few midcareer analysts.”).  
 78. This difficulty is attributed to both the substance of the solutions, see, e.g., WMD 
Commission Report, supra note 67, at 26 (“There is no quick fix for tradecraft problems.”), 
and the failure to implement some of the proposed solutions, see, e.g., Graham-Talent Re-
port, supra note 35, at xxvi (stating that implementation has been limited to defense, 
intelligence, and homeland security); WMD Commission Report, supra note 67, at 539. 
 79. See Richard A. Posner, Uncertain Shield: The U.S. Intelligence System in 
the Throes of Reform 44 (2006); see also Robert Jervis, Reports, Politics, and Intelligence 
Failures: The Case of Iraq, 29 J. Strategic Stud. 3, 10–12 (2006) (“[I]ntelligence failures 
have occurred in all countries and all eras”), available at http://www.columbia.edu/ 
cu/siwps/publication_files/Intelligence%20reform_JERVIS.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2009); 
David Kahn, The Rise of Intelligence, 85 Foreign Aff., Sept.–Oct. 2006, at 125, 134 (“[Intel-
ligence] will never be decisive on its own.”); Paul R. Pillar, Intelligent Design? The Unending 
Saga of Intelligence Reform, 87 Foreign Aff., Mar.–Apr. 2008, at 138, 144 (“Betts is correct 
in arguing that these inherent enemies constitute an almost insurmountable obstacle and that 
intelligence failures are not only inevitable but natural. [As Betts notes,] ‘[t]he awful truth . . . 
is that the best of intelligence systems will have big failures.’”). Even the WMD Commission 
Report is not very optimistic about its own recommendations’ potential for success. See WMD 
Commission Report, supra note 67, at 46 (“Stealing [WMD] secrets [through intelligence 
efforts] . . . is no easy task, and failure is more common than success.”); id. at 253 (asserting 
that “it is apparent . . . that the [Intelligence] Community is not well-postured to replicate” its 
success in detecting WMD capabilities in Libya). 
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International inspections regimes are similarly limited in their ability 
to generate certainty with regard to the existence of WMD arsenals.80 
One problem is the insufficient technical capabilities of international 
inspection agencies.81 Another problem, especially with respect to 
chemical and biological weapons, is the limited authority or mandate of 
international inspection regimes.82 Even if those issues are overcome, it 
has been hard for inspectors to agree on conclusions once they obtain 
significant findings.83 
Another obstacle to closing intelligence gaps about WMD capabili-
ties and programs concerns the nature of modern WMD technology.84 
Many of the components that go into WMD are dual use (that is, able to 
                                                                                                                      
 80. See John Hart & Vitaly Fedchenko, WMD Inspection and Verification Regimes: 
Political and Technical Challenges, in Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction 95, 96 
(Nathan E. Busch & Daniel H. Joyner eds., 2009) (“The fundamental challenge in carrying out 
any verification assessment is that, in the absence of an indisputable violation . . . uncertainty 
that the state is adhering to its obligations can exist.”); see also George Jahn, UN: New Ura-
nium Traces Found in Syria, ABC News, June 5, 2009, available at http:// 
abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=7767362 (last visited Oct. 5, 2009) (describing 
the inability of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to develop an accurate picture 
of Iranian or Syrian nuclear programs despite inspections).  
 81. See Hart & Fedchenko, supra note 80, at 101–08 (discussing IAEA’s technical 
limitations); Council on Foreign Relations, supra note 35 (discussing a “lack of adequate 
verification and enforcement mechanisms available to the IAEA”). This is especially true with 
regard to biological weapons inspections. Stephen Black, UNSCOM and the Iraqi Biological 
Weapons Program: Implications for Arms Control, 18 Pol. & Life Sci. 62, 63 (1999) (noting 
the “technical complexities inherent to [biological weapons] arms control”). 
 82. For example, the IAEA has substantial authority to inspect activities related to nu-
clear fuel-cycle activities, but has very little capacity to inspect items and activities suggestive 
of weaponization in the absence of a finding of nuclear materials. Mohamed ElBaradei, Dir. 
Gen., IAEA, Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Arms Control: Are We Making Progress? 3 (Nov. 
7, 2005), available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/static/npp/2005conference/ 
presentations/elbaradei.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2009) (“[T]he Agency’s legal authority to in-
vestigate possible parallel weaponization activity is limited, absent some nexus linking the 
activity to nuclear material.”); Ivo Daalder & Jan Lodal, The Logic of Zero: Toward a World 
Without Nuclear Weapons, 87 Foreign Aff., Nov.–Dec. 2008, at 80, 88 (explaining that the 
IAEA “has limited authority to inspect suspect sites”). Similar problems curtail the effective-
ness of the Biological Weapons Convention, which lacks a substantive inspectorate and can 
only be activated through the use of “challenge inspections” that are politically sensitive and 
risky for a state to request. See Hart & Fedchenko, supra note 80, at 102.  
 83. See Jack M. Beard, The Shortcomings of Indeterminacy in Arms Control Regimes: 
The Case of the Biological Weapons Convention, 101 Am. J. Int’l L. 271, 302 (2007) (“[I]n 
1992 the United States, Britain, and Russia undertook to ascertain BWC compliance through a 
series of voluntary visits to nonmilitary sites of concern under the nonbinding ‘Trilateral 
Framework Agreement’ . . . [but] participants could not agree on the implications of what they 
had observed during their visits.”). 
 84. Ashton Carter, How to Counter WMDs, 83 Foreign Aff., Sept.–Oct. 2004, at 72, 
83 (“WMD activities are inherently difficult to monitor. It is comparatively easy to keep tabs 
on the size and disposition of armies, the numbers and types of conventional weaponry such as 
tanks and aircraft, and even the operational doctrines and plans of military establishments . . . . 
By their nature, in contrast, WMD concentrate destructive power in small packages and tight 
groups.”) (emphasis added). 
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serve civilian as well as military roles), which severely complicates dif-
ferentiating legitimate from potentially hostile efforts.85 Consequently, 
this makes “some of the weapons that would be most dangerous in the 
hands of terrorists or rogue nations . . . difficult to detect.”86 According to 
one expert, “[t]here are very few activities, materials or equipment un-
ambiguously associated with the manufacture of nuclear weapons, and 
the chances are slim that the IAEA would detect one that was.”87 Accu-
rate capability assessment therefore requires understanding and judging 
a suspect state’s intentions for how it plans to use technologies or com-
ponent parts.88 
Additionally, WMD are easy to conceal—in some cases increasingly 
so—which adds to the difficulty in tracking them. Nuclear power 
facilities can be used as cover for clandestine nuclear weapons 
programs89 and weapons-grade uranium can be shielded from traditional 
detection techniques.90 Biological and chemical weapons are easy to hide 
because they can be manufactured in commercial buildings lacking 
suspicious signatures.91 Biological weapons in particular are easily 
hidden.92 Bioweapons labs can be concealed within routine research labs, 
pharmaceutical manufacturing sites, or vaccine production labs.93 WMD 
can increasingly be produced with very little lead time, which has the 
effect of lowering the window of opportunity that the intelligence 
community has to detect them.94 
A further reason why intelligence gaps about WMD capabilities and 
programs cannot be closed is fairly obvious but quite relevant: “nations 
and terrorist groups do not easily part with their secrets—and they guard 
nothing more jealously than secrets related to nuclear, biological, and 
                                                                                                                      
 85. See Graham-Talent Report, supra note 35, at 35; WMD Commission Report, 
supra note 67, at 521. 
 86. WMD Commission Report, supra note 67, at 4; see also Graham-Talent Re-
port, supra note 35, at 9 (“[T]he materials and equipment needed to produce biowarfare 
agents also have legitimate uses in scientific research and commercial industry . . . .”).  
 87. James M. Acton, The Problem with Nuclear Mind Reading, 51 Survival, Feb.–
Mar. 2009, at 119, 121. 
 88. On the illustrative problem of uranium centrifuge technology for inspections re-
gimes, see Houston G. Wood et al., The Gas Centrifuge and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation, 
Physics Today, Sept. 2008, at 40. 
 89. See Graham-Talent Report, supra note 35, at 45. 
 90. See WMD Commission Report, supra note 67, at 5. 
 91. See id. at 16. 
 92. Id. at 4–5; Carter, supra note 84, at 83. 
 93. Graham-Talent Report, supra note 35, at 35.  
 94. See Bobbitt, supra note 58, at 11 (“[I]t is now possible for states and terror groups 
to arm themselves with WMD in a small fraction of the time it has hitherto taken.”). 
WAXMAN FTP 3_C.DOC 11/13/2009  9:18 AM 
20 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 31:1 
 
chemical weapons.”95 As detection efforts are effective in one case, states 
adapt to confound them.96 Moreover, actors sometimes have incentives to 
exaggerate the state of their WMD programs.97  
For all of these reasons, WMD capability intelligence will likely re-
main as it is now: highly murky and uncertain. As a result, in future 
crises we cannot confidently expect moments like during the 1962 Cu-
ban Missile Crisis, when U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai 
Stevenson presented “incontrovertible” photographic evidence of Soviet 
missiles being assembled in Cuban territory to both the U.N. Security 
Council and a live television audience.98 Instead, we can expect moments 
more like Secretary of State Colin Powell’s globally broadcast presenta-
tion before the U.N. Security Council forty years later, in which he 
painted a picture of Iraq’s likely WMD programs with a series of cir-
cumstantial pieces of evidence that together indicated likelihood, but far 
from certainty, of Saddam Hussein’s WMD arsenal.99 
As mentioned earlier, this issue of “capability uncertainty” is a rela-
tively new challenge for anticipatory or precautionary self-defense 
doctrine, because in an era of conventional warfare among states, an ad-
versary’s first strike capability could usually be assumed or assessed 
with high confidence. True, the history of modern conventional warfare 
is also replete with examples of intelligence gaps concerning adversary 
capabilities and resulting strategic surprises.100 For example, take Ger-
many’s unexpected ability to drive through the Ardennes forest against 
France in 1940, bypassing the Maginot line and defying France’s entire 
                                                                                                                      
 95. WMD Commission Report, supra note 67, at 46; see also Posner, supra note 79, 
at 34 (noting that the mere existence of intelligence forces enemies to conceal their intentions 
and capabilities, which causes the enemy to suffer costs and delays). 
 96. See Betts, supra note 62, at 23 (arguing that since Iran has long been on notice that 
it is in the “crosshairs of American military planners,” it would be surprising if Iranian strate-
gists “have failed to disperse and conceal important facilities in the interests of frustrating U.S. 
intelligence collection”). 
 97. See WMD Commission Report, supra note 67, at 251 (noting that mere procure-
ment activities should not be equated with actual technical capabilities); Jervis, supra note 79, 
at 43 (arguing that some countries have an incentive to lie about their capabilities to posture 
that they have a deterrent). 
 98. See Adlai Stevenson, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., United Nations Security Coun-
cil Address on Soviet Missiles in Cuba (Oct. 25, 1962), available at http:// 
www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/adlaistevensonunitednationscuba.html (last visited Oct. 
5, 2009).  
 99. Colin Powell, U.S. Sec’y of State, Presentation to the U.N. Security Council on the 
U.S. Case Against Iraq (Feb. 6, 2003), available at http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/02/05/ 
sprj.irq.powell.transcript (last visited Oct. 5, 2009). 
 100. See Richard K. Betts, Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are 
Inevitable, 31 World Pol. 61 (1978); Richard K. Betts, Conventional Deterrence: Predictive 
Uncertainty and Policy Confidence, 37 World Pol. 153 (1985). 
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pre-war defensive assumptions.101 But contemporary WMD capability 
uncertainty greatly complicates strategic planning and induces insecurity 
not only because of the magnitude of doubt—what is the probability that 
a state has or is about to have WMD?—but also because that state’s 
crossing the WMD threshold has the potential to alter so radically the 
balance of power. 
The central epistemic challenge at the heart of this paper is well 
summarized by Michael Reisman and Andrea Armstrong: 
The evolution of weapons systems that are ever more rapid and 
destructive and that may be initiated without warning or with 
very narrow warning windows has been invoked as a justifica-
tion for preemption. But ultimately the central issue is 
assessment by the risk-averse security specialists of one interna-
tional actor of the intentions of another actor who has or may 
acquire the weapons. In an international system marked by radi-
cally different cultures, values, and, as a consequence, factual 
perceptions and their strategic assessments, an act of preemptive 
self-defense, based upon one actor’s self-perceived good faith 
conviction, will often look like serious or hysterical misjudg-
ment to some actors and like either cynical or self-deluded, 
naked aggression to others.102 
II. Three Approaches 
A key role for international law is regulating uses of force in ways 
that both constrain it appropriately and narrow the gap between what 
Reisman and Armstrong characterize as good faith convictions and hys-
terical misjudgments.103 That is, law should guide decisionmaking and 
help improve the informational conditions that underlie it. Or, put an-
other way, law should improve accuracy of decisionmaking by 
permitting force when its use would be beneficial, and by helping to re-
strain it when it would not. Further, it should enhance the legitimacy of 
certain decisionmaking, by channeling opinions of key actors in the in-
ternational system according to general norms. 
                                                                                                                      
 101. See Ernest R. May, Strange Victory: Hitler’s Conquest of France 347–61 
(2001) (explaining that German victory resulted from superior imaginativeness in planning). 
 102. W. Michael Reisman & Andrea Armstrong, The Past and Future of the Claim of 
Preemptive Self-Defense, 100 Am. J. Int’l L. 525, 526 (2006). 
 103. See Doyle, supra note 20, at 26–28; Richard N. Haass, War of Necessity, War 
of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars 222 (2009); Thomas M. Franck, The Power of 
Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Power: International Law in an Age of Power Disequilib-
rium, 100 Am. J. Int’l L. 88, 101–05 (2006). 
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A. WMD and the Use of Force Debate 
Approaches to this problem of precautionary force and emergent 
WMD threats generally fall into three categories that I label the tradi-
tional view, the unilateralist view, and the reasonable necessity view. 
Each is rooted in different assumptions about international relations and 
the impact of WMD proliferation. 
1. The Traditional View 
The traditional view holds that the threat of WMD strengthens the 
need to interpret anticipatory self-defense requirements narrowly. It re-
tains a strict imminence requirement for anticipatory self-defense and 
directs discretion about other uses of force, absent an armed attack, to 
the U.N. Security Council as sole arbiter of legality. The 2004 Report of 
the U.N. High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change104—a re-
port endorsed by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan—emphasized that 
“according to long established international law, [a state] can take mili-
tary action as long as the threatened attack is imminent, no other means 
would deflect it and the action is proportionate.”105 “The problem arises,” 
it acknowledged, “where the threat in question is not imminent but still 
claimed to be real: for example the acquisition, with allegedly hostile 
intent, of nuclear weapons-making capability.”106 But the Panel’s solution 
was not to expand the scope of self-defense; instead it was to rely on the 
U.N. Security Council as the judge of threats to peace and security and 
to fashion appropriate remedies.107  
Compared to those holding alternative views, adherents to this view 
weight the harms of false positives (uses of force in self-defense that 
were not actually necessary) relatively high. They emphasize, for exam-
ple, that WMD proliferation raises the danger of too lenient a standard 
for use of force in anticipatory self-defensive, because it may spur states 
to pursue WMD as deterrents.108 Of particular concern to advocates of 
the traditional view is the risk of “pretextual” false positives, or states 
representing that a use of force is justified by legitimate considerations, 
when in fact it is rooted in impermissible motivations.109  
                                                                                                                      
 104. U.N. High-Level Panel, supra note 59, at vii–x. 
 105. Id. ¶ 188. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See id. ¶ 190.  
 108. See Jack I. Garvey, A New Architecture for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weap-
ons, 12 J. Conflict & Security L. 339, 345 (2007); Reisman & Armstrong, supra note 102, 
at 549 (noting, without rejecting, that preemptive self-defense doctrine has been used to justify 
North Korea’s nuclear weapons program). 
 109. See Franck, supra note 103, at 95–96; Jules Lobel, The Use of Force to Respond to 
Terrorist Attacks: The Bombing of Sudan and Afghanistan, 24 Yale J. Int’l L. 537, 557 
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This view is rooted in institutionalist or liberal-institutionalist inter-
national relations theory110 and dominates European international legal 
thought.111 The traditional view generally assumes a model of state be-
havior that is highly responsive to multilateral process, international 
organizations, and legal norms; and that view offers great hope for sta-
bility through international cooperation and consensus-building.112 The 
traditional view also generally reflects skepticisms of military force and 
intervention, and a predisposition toward non-forceful methods of con-
flict resolution.113 
Accordingly, holders of this view also have high confidence in the 
capacity of the U.N. Security Council to resolve crises.114 It is worth 
quoting at length the U.N. High-Level Panel’s answer to its own question 
whether “a State [can], without going to the Security Council, claim in 
these circumstances the right to act, in anticipatory self-defence, not just 
                                                                                                                      
(1999); see also Henkin, supra note 26, at 47 (“States that have used force have sometimes 
construed the law so as to justify their actions or have defended against charges of violation by 
denying or distorting the facts or mischaracterizing the circumstances.”).  
 110. See Thomas H. Lee, International Law, International Relations Theory, and Pre-
emptive War: The Vitality of Sovereign Equality Today, 67 Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 
2004, at 147, 158 (“All [international relations] theorists agree that the security dilemma per-
tains as a descriptive matter today, but they debate its severity and the prospects for mitigation 
through international institutions and norms . . . . [Some] think it can be substantially reduced 
by international institutions; realists are skeptical of even that.”). Classic works in this vein 
include Robert O. Keohane, Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold 
War, in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate 269 (David A. 
Baldwin ed., 1993); Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Re-
gimes as International Variables, in International Regimes 1 (Stephen D. Kraser ed., 
1983); Robert Jervis, Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, 30 World Pol. 167 (1978). 
 111. See Eur. Union Inst. for Sec. Studies, European Security Strategy: A Se-
cure Europe in a Better World (2003) (proposed by Javier Solana and adopted by heads 
of state and government at the European Council in Brussels), available at http:// 
www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/solanae.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2009) [hereinafter Euro-
pean Security Strategy]; Milagros Alvarez-Verdugo, Comparing U.S. and E.U. Strategies 
Against Weapons of Mass Destruction: Some Legal Consequences, 2005 Ann. Surv. Int’l & 
Comp. L. 119. 
 112. See European Security Strategy, supra note 111, at 14 (“We are committed to 
upholding and developing international law. The fundamental framework for international 
relations is the United Nations Charter. The United Nations Security Council has the primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.”); Hanspeter Neuhold, 
Law and Force in International Relations—European and American Positions, 64 Heidel-
berg J. Int’l L. 263, 267 (2004) (“Europe attaches more importance than the American 
superpower to multilateralism, international organisations and international law, with a firm 
belief that the United Nations ought to play a strong role.”). 
 113. See Neuhold, supra note 112, at 266 (“[T]he two catastrophic world wars which all 
European nations lost undermined the confidence in the efficacy of military force. Europeans 
therefore prefer comprehensive political settlements which address the root causes of internal 
and inter-state conflicts and favour economic and political incentives over military coercion.”).  
 114. See, e.g., Allen S. Weiner, The Use of Force and Contemporary Security Threats: 
Old Medicine for New Ills?, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 415, 448–90 (2006). 
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pre-emptively (against an imminent or proximate threat) but preventively 
(against a non-imminent or non-proximate one)”: 
Those who say “yes” argue that the potential harm from some 
threats . . . is so great that one simply cannot risk waiting until 
they become imminent, and that less harm may be done . . . by 
acting earlier.  
The short answer is that if there are good arguments for preven-
tive military action, with good evidence to support them, they 
should be put to the Security Council, which can authorize such 
action if it chooses to. If it does not so choose, there will be, by 
definition, time to pursue other strategies . . . .115  
To “those impatient with such a response,” the Panel report re-
sponds:  
[T]he answer must be that, in a world full of perceived potential 
threats, the risk to the global order and the norm of non-
intervention on which it continues to be based is simply too 
great for the legality of unilateral preventive action, as distinct 
from collectively endorsed action, to be accepted.116  
Professor Thomas Franck offers similar reasoning: 
[A] right to act without reference to the Security Council is lim-
ited to instances of actual or imminent attack. . . . Even in the era 
of weapons of mass destruction, such a claim to use forceful 
measures in preventive self-defense must still be made to the sat-
isfaction of the Security Council. . . . A state that believes itself 
threatened by the long-term hostile intentions of another, before 
resorting to preventive action, must demonstrate the actuality of 
that threat to the satisfaction of the appropriate international in-
stitution. Without some jurying or adjudicative process, the right 
of preventive action would otherwise become an unbridled li-
cense for all states to practice aggression.117 
In other words, alternatives to the traditional view are likely to generate 
too much force in the international system. 
2. The Unilateralist View 
A second view—the unilateralist view—holds that in a world of pro-
liferating WMD, states have a right of self-defensive force against some 
                                                                                                                      
 115. See U.N. High-Level Panel, supra note 59, ¶¶ 189–90. 
 116. Id. ¶ 191. 
 117. Franck, supra note 103, at 104. 
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states that have, or will soon have, WMD capabilities even when no im-
minent plans to attack are identifiable.118 This view is most famously 
reflected in the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States. 
That document proclaimed that “[t]he greater the threat, the greater is the 
risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipa-
tory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the 
time and place of the enemy’s attack.”119 The label “unilateralist” is not 
meant to suggest that force is always used by a single state acting alone; 
rather, it is meant to suggest that legal decisionmaking is decentralized 
and self-regulated by those states contemplating force.  
The unilateralist view jettisons the traditional imminence require-
ment on the grounds that, in the context of WMD, responsible states 
cannot wait until specific and immediate threats materialize.120 The uni-
lateralist view expands self-defensive latitude against non-imminent 
WMD threats because, it is argued, a narrower rule skews risk too much 
against false positives; the risk of false negatives (failing to use self-
defensive force in the face of potential danger) is too great in the WMD 
context.121 
While commonly associated with the George W. Bush administra-
tion, this understanding of the U.S. position has roots long pre-dating his 
2000 election122 and has support across partisan lines.123 As Walter Slo-
combe observed in 2003, “the current US administration is by no means 
the first to espouse the notion that the United States has the right, even 
the duty, to act alone if the nation’s vital interests are at stake . . . .”124 In 
                                                                                                                      
 118. See, e.g., David B. Rivkin, Jr. et al., Preemption and Law in the Twenty-First Cen-
tury, 5 Chi. J. Int’l L. 467 (2005); John Yoo, International Law and the War in Iraq, 97 Am. 
J. Int’l L. 563 (2003). 
 119. National Security Strategy, supra note 5, at 15. 
 120. See, e.g., id. at 15–16. 
 121. See Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence 
in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, 25 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 539, 552–53 (2002) 
(“Mistakes may be made. It is better, however, that the price of those mistakes be paid by 
states that so posture themselves than by innocent states asked patiently to await slaughter.”); 
Interview by Wolf Blitzer with Condoleezza Rice, Nat’l Sec. Advisor to the President, on 
CNN Late Edition (Sept. 8, 2002), available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/ 
0209/08/le.00.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2009) (“The problem here is that there will always be 
some uncertainty about how quickly [Saddam Hussein] can acquire nuclear weapons. But we 
don’t [want] the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud.”). 
 122. See Lobel, supra note 109, at 553. 
 123. See, e.g., Sen. John Kerry, Presidential Debate in Coral Gables, Florida, 40 
Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 2175, 2188 (Sept. 30, 2004) (“The President always has the right 
. . . [of] preemptive strike . . . . No president, through all of American history, has ever ceded, 
and nor would I, the right to preempt in any way necessary to protect the United States of 
America.”). 
 124. Slocombe, supra note 47, at 119. See generally Marc Trachtenberg, Preventive War 
and U.S. Foreign Policy, 16 Security Stud. 1 (2007) (arguing that preventive war thinking 
has long played a role in U.S. foreign policy thinking). 
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1994, the Clinton administration strongly considered military attacks on 
North Korean facilities when “faced with the highly dangerous prospect 
that North Korea could, within months, have five or six nuclear bombs 
and an active weapons program.”125 Nevertheless, the unilateralist view 
gained wide attention during the Bush years because its senior officials 
emphasized it so forcefully and openly.126 
Whereas the traditional view is rooted in liberal-institutionalist in-
ternational relations theory, the unilateralist view is rooted in realist 
thinking, with its emphasis on individual states as the key unit of analy-
sis, making security decisions based on self-centered calculations of 
relative power in a largely anarchic international system.127 Just as the 
traditional view tends to reflect a suspicion of military action, the unilat-
eralist view carries a converse skepticism of international law and 
organizations. This perspective has drawn new strength and scholarly 
support from contemporary military interventionist thinking, character-
ized by strong beliefs about the efficacy of force to combat proliferation 
and other threats.128 
3. The Reasonable Necessity View 
A third and final approach—which I favor—is the “reasonable ne-
cessity” approach to regulating the use of force against WMD threats. 
While embracing multilateral-process solutions when possible, this 
                                                                                                                      
 125. Ashton B. Carter & William J. Perry, Preventive Defense: A New Secu-
rity Strategy for America 128 (1999); see also William J. Perry, Proliferation on the 
Peninsula: Five North Korean Nuclear Crises, 607 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci., 
Sept. 2006, at 78 (advocating a sustained effort to prevent North Korea from building a nu-
clear arsenal); Elaine Monaghan, Clinton Planned Attack on Korean Nuclear Reactors, Times 
(London), Dec. 16, 2002, at 12 (quoting Clinton as saying of the North Korean nuclear crisis 
in the 1990s: “We actually drew up plans to attack North Korea and to destroy their reactors 
and we told them we would attack unless they ended their nuclear programme.”). 
 126. See Doyle, supra note 20, at 27. 
 127. See Allen Buchanan & Robert O. Keohane, The Preventive Use of Force: A Cosmo-
politan Institutional Proposal, 18 Ethics & Int’l Aff. 1, 3 (Mar. 2004) (“Realists hold that 
. . . [leaders] may employ force, including preemptively, if they deem it necessary for the 
pursuit of state interests.”); Lee, supra note 110, at 159 (“[W]hat we call the ‘laws of war,’ a 
realist might say, simply reflects principles consistent with rational state action under the secu-
rity dilemma. Any preemptive war based on a subjectively reasonable perception of threat is a 
lawful war.”). See generally Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics 
(1979) (offering a “neorealist” account of international relations, marked by states as unitary 
actors pursuing self-interest and relative power). 
 128. See, e.g., John Bolton, Surrender Is Not an Option 430–37 (2007); Eliot 
Cohen, A Revolution in Warfare, 75 Foreign Aff., Mar.–Apr. 1996, at 37, 45; see also Alva-
rez-Verdugo, supra note 111, at 125–27 (describing emphasis on unilateral military measures 
as an element of recent U.S. counter-proliferation strategy); Charles Krauthammer, Irving 
Kristol Lecture at the American Enterprise Institute Annual Dinner: Democratic Realism (Feb. 
10, 2004), available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20040227_book755text.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 5, 2009). 
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school favors objective standards for judging resort to force outside the 
U.N. Security Council system.129  
While the use of force would remain justified when the conditions of 
customary anticipatory self-defense are met, this school seeks to build 
upon the logic underlying that doctrine. It seeks to adapt use of force 
rules to the unique challenges of WMD threats and proliferation, while 
maintaining fidelity to the imminence requirement’s core purposes of 
constraining the use of force except when other options have been ex-
hausted and when waiting poses an unacceptable risk of losing the 
opportunity to eradicate the threat—all of this judged by objective stan-
dards of reasonableness.130 Whereas some adherents to the unilateralist 
school seek to overturn the U.N. Charter system, reasonable necessity 
proponents generally seek to preserve it, by articulating standards to 
guide U.N. Security Council deliberations, assertions of self-defense (as 
protected by Article 51), or exceptions to Article 2(4)’s prohibition on 
the use of force.131 
This school draws on a combination of realist and liberal theory. Like 
realism (and unilateralism), it acknowledges the limits of international 
norms and institutions to address threats and constrain self-defensive ac-
tions. By analyzing the issue through the perspective of a responsible 
threatened state, the reasonable necessity approach acknowledges that—
where the two conflict—a state’s threat perceptions will likely have more 
decisional weight than international norms or how the threat fits within a 
set of general legal principles. The reasonable necessity approach attempts 
to minimize this conflict by bringing the law and the state’s situation more 
closely in line, making use-of-force regulation more context-sensitive.132 
At the same time, like liberal-institutional theory (and the traditionalists), 
it affirms the potential role of law in guiding state behavior and places a 
premium on legitimacy in decisionmaking and uses of force.133  
Although they share these theoretical foundations and orientations, 
the different ways of assessing reasonable necessity can reflect various 
combinations of competing assumptions, policy priorities and ideologi-
cal principles. These different positions within the reasonable necessity 
school are bound by a common sense that developments in the interna-
tional system—particularly the proliferation of WMD—have 
                                                                                                                      
 129. Within this school is a sub-debate: whether reasonable necessity should be applied 
to authorize force in advance of intervention (justification) versus to excuse force after an 
intervention (mitigation). This paper does not treat in detail this sub-debate. See George P. 
Fletcher & Jens David Ohlin, Defending Humanity: When Force Is Justified and 
Why 107–28 (2008). 
 130. See, e.g., Sofaer, supra note 45, at 213–26. 
 131. See infra notes 136–141 and accompanying text. 
 132. See sources cited supra notes 127–128. 
 133. See sources cited supra notes 110–112. 
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undermined the usefulness of the restrictive system contemplated by the 
traditional view, but that the unilateralist view is an unacceptable alterna-
tive. Further, reasonable necessity proponents share a belief that a 
superior system of force regulation can be developed by reference to ob-
jective indicators linked to policy objectives (accuracy, legitimacy, etc.), 
and the presence of which would justify a reasonable state’s resort to 
force in a particular circumstance. Their substantive differences on ques-
tions such as the relative weight to give false positives and false 
negatives are reflected in the specific factors they identify and how they 
locate the authority to apply the analysis.134  
Abraham Sofaer, for example, offers a relatively realist scheme, pro-
posing four factors for use in establishing the reasonableness of using 
force in a given circumstance: the magnitude of the threat, its probability 
of occurring, the exhaustion of peaceful alternatives, and consistency 
with the underlying purposes of the U.N. Charter.135 All of these factors 
are selected for their capacity to “establish[]the legitimacy of using force 
under international law principles and U.N. Charter values.”136 Sofaer 
envisions these criteria as a framework on which individual states could 
rely to establish the legality of a precautionary use of force, especially in 
the face of WMD threats. 
Closer to the liberal end of the reasonable necessity spectrum are the 
conditions for the use of precautionary self-defense against states advo-
cated by the Princeton Project on National Security.137 These include 
exhaustion, “overwhelming confidence” in the action’s foundational in-
telligence and operational prospects, preparedness for the aftermath, and 
the clear endorsement of the U.N. Security Council or “another broadly 
representative multilateral body.”138 This approach’s principal distin-
guishing characteristics include the high epistemic standard it sets for 
intelligence and the requirement of actual multilateral authorization, 
which precludes unilateral application but allows for some action outside 
the U.N. Security Council system. Although both characteristics have 
qualitative analogues in the Sofaer framework, the Princeton Project sets 
higher and clearer thresholds for each, reflecting relatively greater con-
cern for false positives and appreciation of the importance of multilateral 
process.139  
                                                                                                                      
 134. See, e.g., Doyle, supra note 20, at 96 (“Imperfect and incomplete as they are, the 
right decisions about prevention in the world we now live in will rest with democratic publics 
who understand that their acts will set precedents that others will follow.”). 
 135.  See Sofaer, supra note 45, at 220. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Princeton Project on Nat’l Sec., Forging a World of Liberty Under Law: 
U.S. National Security in the 21st Century (2006) [hereinafter Princeton Project]. 
 138. Id. at 32. 
 139. See id.  
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Falling somewhere between these two approaches is that of Michael 
Doyle, who proposes evaluating military action against non-imminent 
threats along four alliterative dimensions: the lethality of the threat, the 
likelihood of its materialization, the legitimacy of the proposed action 
(determined by reference to traditional just war principles), and the le-
gality of the target state’s domestic and international behavior and the 
threatened state’s response.140 Instead of requiring multilateral authoriza-
tion or treating all U.N. Security Council actions as an input into a 
determination of reasonableness—as do the Princeton Project and So-
faer, respectively—for Doyle the U.N. Security Council would remain 
the preferred but non-exclusive means of response. To this end, he re-
quires exhaustion of U.N. Security Council remedies prior to unilateral 
application, as well as national and international reporting of the legal 
analysis.141  
When used to evaluate individual cases, a reasonable necessity ap-
proach’s conclusions are shaped not just by the selection of criteria, but 
also by how the criteria are applied to specific facts of a case. To illus-
trate, compare Sofaer’s and Doyle’s separate analyses of the 2003 Iraq 
War. Sofaer found a persuasive legal case for invasion,142 while Doyle 
found the intervention “illegitimate, radically disproportionate, and un-
justifiable.”143 Under Doyle’s approach, the case for war foundered 
largely on the basis of a criterion his scheme shares with Sofaer’s: “like-
lihood.”144 The question of capability is embedded in this factor and each 
approach to likelihood addressed this element with a different manner 
and intensity. Doyle’s treatment of likelihood focused heavily on the 
evidentiary strength of the claims that Saddam Hussein was developing 
or retained a WMD capability—the very capability uncertainty issue at 
the heart of this paper.145 Sofaer, on the other hand, devoted more atten-
tion to the regime’s behavioral history and indications of its propensity 
to employ WMD.146  
                                                                                                                      
 140. See Doyle, supra note 20, at 46.  
 141. See id. at 60–62. 
 142. Sofaer, supra note 45, at 224. 
 143. Doyle, supra note 20, at 90–91. 
 144. See id. 90–92; Sofaer, supra note 45, at 221–23. 
 145. Doyle, supra note 20, at 90–92; see also Miriam Sapiro, Iraq: The Shifting Sands 
of Preemptive Self-Defense, 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 599, 604 (2003) (“[T]he danger should be 
imminent in that it can be identified credibly, specifically, and with a high degree of cer-
tainty.”). 
 146. Sofaer, supra note 45, at 221–23. In addition to evaluating how each of the three 
schools deals with the peradventure surrounding this “likelihood” component, the remainder 
of this paper elucidates critical subsidiary issues involved in a substantive legal analysis of 
capabilities under uncertainty. This clarification is especially relevant to reasonable necessity 
systems like Doyle’s and Sofaer’s, and should help ensure that different conclusions reflect 
different policy choices rather than confusion. 
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While advocating different criteria, all of these reasonable necessity 
examples share a concern that U.N. Security Council monopoly author-
ity over the use of force risks under-protecting states from contemporary 
threats.147 They also share a belief that widely accepted standards can 
help fill that gap in protection without damaging international legal 
norms prohibiting armed aggression—and that in the long term, these 
standards will strengthen these norms.  
B. Three Approaches to Capability Uncertainty 
While the stakes may be uniquely high in contemplating force 
against WMD threats, the problem of accurately assessing a factual 
premise key to adjudicating legal authority is a very common one. Three 
approaches to judging disputed issues of fact critical to a legal appraisal 
are widespread in the law, and they correspond to the three major 
schools of precautionary self-defense: the use of subjective standards, 





Approach to Capability 
Uncertainty 
Traditional View Absent imminent threat, force 
allowed only with U.N. Security 
Council authorization 
Process 
Unilateralist View Force allowed if good faith 
belief in WMD threat 
Subjective standard 
Reasonable Necessity View Force allowed if reasonable 




The following Sections examine and evaluate how each school of 
precautionary self-defense attempts to manage problems of WMD capa-
bility uncertainty. All three schools promise to calibrate effectively the 
appropriate level of force in the international system (allowing enough 
force to deal effectively with genuine threats but not so much as to pose 
threats to peace and stability), and to do so in a manner consistent with a 
                                                                                                                      
 147. See, e.g., Doyle, supra note 20, at 33 (“[The Security Council] has in numerous 
instances in the past behaved irresponsibly—failed to authorize the use of force when it was 
arguably justified . . . .”); Princeton Project, supra note 137, at 23 (“The United Nations is 
failing to live up to its potential, though. Security Council resolutions are often unenforced or 
under-enforced.”). 
 148. Consider, as an example, possible legal approaches to determining a police officer’s 
authority to search a home for criminal activity: one based on the officer’s state of mind and 
purposes (subjective standards); one based on guidelines for a reasonable officer in that posi-
tion (objective standards); or one based on obtaining authorization from a magistrate 
(process). 
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normative vision of authoritative legal rules. This Part therefore consid-
ers each approach especially against these common objectives, which I 
respectively label “accuracy” and “legitimacy.” 
1. The Traditional View: A Process Approach 
The traditional view relies heavily on a process approach for judging 
threats, including their factual premises such as state capability.149 Under 
the traditional view, the U.N. Security Council is the multilateral body 
charged with making the capability assessments incident to determining 
the existence of a “threat to international peace and security” sufficient 
to justify the use of military force.150 These capability assessments are in 
turn informed by a number of auxiliary multilateral processes, both from 
within the U.N. system and from interlocking and overlapping treaties 
and multilateral organizations. For example, in the course of verifying its 
safeguards and the obligations imposed by treaties such as the Non-
Proliferation Treaty and the Additional Protocol, the Board of Governors 
of the International Atomic Energy Agency reports any determinations of 
non-compliance to the U.N. Security Council, which can then take a 
range of actions including mandating further actions by the IAEA.151 Os-
tensibly, these auxiliary processes will assist the U.N. Security Council 
in determining whether a state poses a threat sufficient to warrant au-
thorization of precautionary force. 
a. Advantages  
Some argue that these multilateral processes have deliberative ad-
vantages that increase accuracy by reducing the risks of error inherent in 
unilateral assessments of proliferators’ capabilities. As Allen Weiner pos-
its, 
[w]ith respect to erroneous assessments, the requirements of Se-
curity Council deliberations and approval regarding the use of 
force to address a particular threat are likely to produce a better-
informed decision, since all Security Council states, and not just 
the state that perceives itself to be threatened, will contribute to 
the assessment of the threat based on data in their possession. 
                                                                                                                      
 149. See Franck, supra note 103, at 102 (“The problem, then, does not lie with formulat-
ing a norm. It lies with the process for implementing it: who, or what institution, what judge 
or jury, should decide whether the norm’s requisites for preemptive action have been met.”); 
id. at 105 (“The basic procedural notion of the Charter is that every nation, before taking mili-
tary action, except in self-defense against an imminent or actual armed attack, must first 
demonstrate to its peers that . . . there exists an actual threat to the peace.”). 
 150. U.N. Charter arts. 39, 42.  
 151. Statute of the Int’l Atomic Energy Agency art. XII.C, Oct. 23, 1956, 8 U.S.T. 1093, 
276 U.N.T.S. 3. 
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The procedural requirements of collective deliberation and in-
formation sharing among Council members thus can serve to 
“correct false beliefs.”152  
Under this view, U.N. Security Council deliberation will facilitate in-
formation exchanges that improve capability appraisals and temper 
states’ tendencies to “worst-case” their estimations—both worthy aims. 
Others emphasize the importance of legitimacy in reaching joint, 
common assessments of threats through multilateral processes.153 In 
discussing empowerment of the U.N. Security Council with a permanent 
inspectorate and other capability-assessment mechanisms, Jessica 
Tuchman Matthews explains that “[t]he effort is worth taking because no 
other entity, existing or imagined, commands the Security Council’s 
universal legitimacy . . . .”154  
This legitimacy can be instrumental to the success of auxiliary proc-
esses that reduce capability uncertainty. The multilateral structure and 
involvement of the United Nations in inspection systems such as the 
IAEA and UNMOVIC155 increase the diplomatic pressures that can pro-
duce greater state compliance, facilitating the investigations that yielded 
                                                                                                                      
 152. Weiner, supra note 114, at 428. 
 153. See Ian Hurd, After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Na-
tions Security Council (2007); Jutta Brunnée, The Security Council and Self-Defence: 
Which Way to Global Security?, in The Security Council and the Use of Force: Theory 
and Reality—A Need for Change? 107, 112 (Niels Blokker & Nico Schrijver eds., 2005) 
(“[T]he Security Council has maintained a unique ability to lend legitimacy to international 
action, including the use of force.”). Especially in the developing world, however, the Security 
Council’s legitimacy has come under increasing challenge. See Press Release, Gen. Assembly, 
When Force Is Considered, There Is No Substitute for Legitimacy Provided by United Na-
tions, Secretary General Says in General Assembly Address, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/8378 (Sept. 
12, 2002), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/SGSM8378.doc.htm (last 
visited Oct. 5, 2009) (“[W]hen States decide to use force to deal with broader threats to inter-
national peace and security, there is no substitute for the unique legitimacy provided by the 
United Nations.”); see also The Secretary-General, Strengthening of the United Nations: An 
Agenda for Further Change, ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. A/57/387 (Sept. 9, 2002), available at http:// 
www.un.org/events/action2/A.57.0387.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2009) (“In the eyes of much of 
the world, the size and composition of the Security Council appear insufficiently representa-
tive. The perceived shortcomings in the Council’s credibility contribute to a slow but steady 
erosion of its authority, which in turn has grave implications for international peace and secu-
rity.”); Bardo Fassbender, Pressure for Security Council Reform, in The UN Security 
Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century 341, 347–48 (David M. Malone ed., 
2004) (noting that developing states feel that they are “grossly under-represented” on the Se-
curity Council, although there is little unanimity between the developing states as to what a 
better system would look like). 
 154. Jessica Tuchman Matthews, WMD and the United Nations, Keynote Speech to the 
International Peace Academy (Mar. 5, 2004). 
 155. U.N. Monitoring, Verification, & Inspection Comm’n, http://www.unmovic.org/ 
(last visited Oct. 5, 2009). 
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the most accurate depictions of Iraq’s WMD capabilities.156 Even skep-
tics of the U.N. Security Council’s efficacy therefore acknowledge the 
practical benefits of its legitimacy.157  
Beyond any legitimacy or deliberative advantages of U.N. Security 
Council process in assessing capabilities, there is a broader argument 
rooted in the traditional view’s understandings of the purposes underly-
ing use of force law and of how international actors operate within it. For 
supporters of the traditional view, one danger of capability uncertainty is 
that states will attempt to exploit this ambiguity to justify impermissible 
uses of force. This sort of concern with states’ pretextual use of stan-
dards animates much of the broader traditional view framework.158 
Always wary of the unilateral application of legal standards, the tradi-
tional view worries that states’ capability assessments will produce 
inflated estimates of the threat, often concocted as pretexts. This reason-
ing is also consistent with the traditional view’s relatively greater 
concern with false positives. If false positives are more dangerous than 
false negatives and capability uncertainty increases the risk of both, a 
sensible approach to the problem of capability uncertainty might focus 
on mitigating the heightened problem of false positives through process 
checks. 
b. Drawbacks 
i. Accuracy Concerns 
If traditionalists are especially worried about false positives, one 
must ask how effectively their approach handles dangers of false nega-
tives. 
                                                                                                                      
 156. See Trevor Findlay, A Standing United Nations WMD Verification Body: 
Necessary and Feasible, An Interim Study Prepared for the Commission on 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (2005); Fareed Zakaria, We Had Good Intel—The UN’s, 
Newsweek, Feb. 9, 2004, at 39. 
 157. See, e.g., Lee Feinstein & Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Duty to Prevent, 83 Foreign 
Aff., Jan.–Feb. 2004, at 136, 148 (observing that “[t]he unmatched legitimacy that the UN 
lends to Security Council actions makes it easier for member states to carry them out and 
harder for the targeted governments to evade them by playing political games”).  
 158. See Weiner, supra note 114, at 427 (“[T]he pre-Charter regime governing the use of 
force, in which states were entitled to use force unilaterally either to vindicate their legal 
rights or to counter perceived threats to their security, had shown itself to be susceptible to 
erroneous and bad-faith implementation. Because this standards-based approach had led to the 
overinclusive and excessive use of force, the Charter’s founders were unwilling to delegate 
substantial discretion to individual states to act as agents to determine the conditions under 
which they might on their own authority use force.”); see also Brownlie, supra note 23, at 
272–75; Antonio Cassese, Return to Westphalia?, Considerations on the Gradual Erosion of 
the Charter System, in The Current Legal Regulation of the Use of Force 505, 516 
(Antonio Cassese ed., 1986) (“[T]he risks of abuse should lead us to interpret [the self-defense 
provision in] Art. 51 very strictly and consider it as giving only very exceptional licence.”). 
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At the outset, consider how the U.N. Charter initially allocated re-
sponsibility for assessing threatening capabilities and how this allocation 
has shifted. At the time of the Charter’s inception, states could discern 
imminent threats more easily, particularly because these threats were 
often accompanied by a large-scale mobilization of conventional forces 
that were often readily observable.159 But due to WMD proliferation, de-
velopments in missile technology, and the expansion in capability 
uncertainty, “the preemptive use of force is often difficult to justify be-
cause clear evidence that a threat is imminent is rare.”160 Since the ability 
to respond to an imminent threat now offers much more limited protec-
tion and U.N. Security Council authorization to use force is the only 
other recourse under the traditional view, the U.N. Security Council as-
sumes a proportionally expanded role in making the capability 
assessments that can support self-defensive action. The U.N. High-Level 
Panel “recognized that it could well be necessary for the Security Coun-
cil to authorize military action in a case like Iraq. . . . [T]he trade-off for 
expanded substantive jurisdiction is a tighter hold than ever on multilat-
eral process.”161 This increased responsibility in judging capabilities 
exceed what was contemplated when the U.N. Security Council was de-
signed.162  
The U.N. Security Council voting system has a structural inclination 
toward underestimating threats and weighing false positives more 
strongly than false negatives—a structural feature especially likely to 
come into play amid capability uncertainty. At least sixty percent of 
                                                                                                                      
 159. See Alex J. Bellamy, Pre-Empting Terror, in Security and the War on Terror 
104, 114 (Alex J. Bellamy et al. eds., 2008) (discussing the contemporary challenges to tradi-
tional self-defense doctrine, noting that “conventional wars are preceded by clear warnings, 
most obviously troop mobilisations and deployments . . . .”). This is not to deny the possibility 
of achieving tactical or strategic surprise in conventional conflicts. However, instances of 
successful surprise in conventional conflicts usually are caused not by an absence of percepti-
ble, objective indicators of an attack, but by the target’s subjective errors in discerning and 
interpreting these signals. See Ephraim Kam, Surprise Attack: The Victim’s Perspective 
37 (1988) (“Analysis of surprise attacks suggests that the intelligence community seldom fails 
to anticipate them owing to a lack of relevant information. In most cases the victim possesses 
an abundance of information indicating the imminence of the attack.”). In contrast, WMD 
threats are characterized by a near-complete absence of perceptible, objective indicators of an 
imminent attack. See Bruce G. Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War 171–73 
(1993). 
 160. See Feinstein & Slaughter, supra note 157, at 147.  
 161. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Security, Solidarity, and Sovereignty: The Grand Themes of 
UN Reform, 99 Am. J. Int’l L. 619, 626 (2005).  
 162. This is evident from the fact, for example, that arms control inspection regimes 
administered through the United Nations long post-date its founding. Article 39 of the U.N. 
Charter states: “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what 
measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore interna-
tional peace and security.” U.N. Charter art. 39. 
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member states and no vetoes from the five permanent members 
(Permanent-5) are required to authorize a military action or threat, 
effectively demanding consensus among a diverse group of nations on a 
subsidiary set of capability questions, many of which may be shrouded 
in uncertainty or ambiguity.163 Even leaving aside the possibility of 
strategic voting and vetoes, this sets a high bar for a threatened state to 
clear, since it must present evidence satisfying the Permanent-5 member 
with the highest evidentiary standards.164 
The evidentiary standards used by the most demanding Permanent-5 
member to evaluate potentially threatening capabilities may owe their 
rigor to considerations unrelated to the goal of accurately discerning the 
existence of a threat, such as self-interest or the Permanent-5 member’s 
relationship with the threatening state.165 In the most extreme cases, a 
member of the Permanent-5 may wholly subordinate the issue of ap-
praising capabilities to self-regard, because its perceived national interest 
would be inconsistent with an authorization of force.166 But policing this 
kind of problem is difficult, because it is often impossible to determine 
clearly whether a particular outcome is due to legitimate considerations 
(for example, good-faith doubts about capability evidence) since the 
U.N. Security Council’s decisionmaking is essentially without standards 
and much of the real deliberation takes place in private between Perma-
nent-5 members.167 
All this speaks to several problems with the traditional view’s ap-
proach to managing capability uncertainty. First, even under ideal 
assumptions of independent voting based on collective interests, it is ques-
tionable whether the most exacting epistemic standards employed by a 
Permanent-5 member represent the appropriate evidentiary threshold for 
calibrating the use of force under capability uncertainty, unless the  
                                                                                                                      
 163. See U.N. Charter art. 27. 
 164. See Acton, supra note 87, at 123–24. For a specific example of this phenomenon in 
practice, see Block on Iran Sanctions, Int’l Herald Trib., Apr. 21, 2006, available at http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2006/04/21/world/europe/21iht-russia.html?_r=1 (last visited Oct. 6, 2009). 
 165. See Council on Foreign Relations, supra note 35 (“[P]olitical calculations have 
caused deadlock at the Security Council, enabling nuclear rogues such as Iran to defy succes-
sive, fairly weak UN sanctions resolutions with virtual impunity.”). 
 166. See Ruth Wedgwood, Unilateral Action in the UN System, 11 Eur. J. Int’l L. 349, 
351 (2000). 
 167. See Ian Johnstone, Security Council Deliberations: The Power of the Better Argu-
ment, 14 Eur. J. Int’l L. 437, 453 (2003) (“Distinguishing true reasoning or sincere 
communication from strategic argumentation in world politics is a challenge.”); id. at 438, 452 
(characterizing the Security Council as a venue for “heated, unsystematic” debate that is “of-
ten”—but not always—principled, and noting that the Council “does not employ judicial 
criteria when it makes decisions” beyond the limitations of the charter). U.N. member states 
have recognized this problem as well. See Thalif Deen, Security Council’s Secretive Habits 
Challenged, Inter Press Service, Mar. 21, 2006, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/ 
component/content/article/200/41252.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2009).  
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danger of false positives truly dwarfs the danger of false negatives. Sec-
ond, there exist virtually no standards or procedural safeguards to ensure 
or encourage a connection between the assessment processes that U.N. 
Security Council members employ and the underlying objective of de-
termining whether sufficient evidence of a threat exists.168 If just one 
member of the Permanent-5 imports considerations that portray doubt 
but are not rationally related to this policy goal, the entire process may 
be confounded and may risk underestimation. While “[a] procedural sys-
tem that errs in the direction of underemployment of force is seen by 
some as desirable, as if no countervailing danger were created,”169 many 
others—especially states facing developing WMD threats—have a sub-
stantially greater concern with false negatives and the danger of 
underestimation.170  
In practice, these structural features tend to restrict the range of ca-
pability evidence that will be germane to a U.N. Security Council 
authorization of force. Since the evidence establishing WMD capabilities 
must satisfy the Permanent-5 member with the highest evidentiary 
threshold, and since there is no framework in place to guide or coordi-
nate standards across members, the conclusions of multilateral auxiliary 
processes (like IAEA reports) will tend to become the de facto and 
largely exclusive basis for U.N. Security Council capability assess-
ments.171 This is because, for one, auxiliary processes like inspections 
                                                                                                                      
 168. See Doyle, supra note 20, at 33 (“[T]he council lacks substantively adequate stan-
dards to guide its deliberations concerning when it should authorize preventive force.”); 
Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 127, at 9 (noting in the context of humanitarian uses of 
force that, in the absence of substantive standards, “authorization is likely to be unprincipled” 
and inadequately connected to normative goals). 
 169. Ruth Wedgwood, The Fall of Saddam Hussein: Security Council Mandates and 
Preemptive Self-Defense, 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 576, 577 (2003). 
 170. See Bobbitt, supra note 58, at 452 (“[T]he rule of law is eroding because the pre-
vailing doctrines of international law are radically insufficient to regulate the efforts of states 
that must cope with global, networked terrorism, and with the related threats of weapons of 
mass destruction . . . . ”); Abraham D. Sofaer, International Security and the Use of Force, in 
Progress in International Law 541, 561 (Russell A. Miller & Rebecca M. Bratspies eds., 
2008) (“[S]elf-defense is a key element in any sensible program to supplement the inadequate, 
collective efforts of the Security Council.”); see also Dore Gold, Op-Ed, Iran’s Nuclear Aspi-
rations Threaten the World, L.A. Times, Aug. 6, 2009, available at http://www.latimes.com/ 
news/opinion/la-oe-gold6-2009aug06,0,3778030.story (last visited Oct. 6, 2009) (arguing 
from Israel’s perspective the need to threaten Iran with force); David E. Sanger, U.S. Says Iran 
Could Expedite Nuclear Bomb, N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 2009, at A1 (quoting Israeli intelligence 
official as saying about U.S. and Israeli assessments about Iran: “We’re all looking at the same 
set of facts. . . . We are interpreting them quite differently than the White House does.”).  
 171. See Acton, supra note 87, at 127, 130 (noting the weight multilateral bodies accord 
IAEA assessments and that “inconclusive” forms of evidence can affect Security Council 
decisionmaking on the basis of reasons apart from the merits, such as self-interest); id. at 135 
(“If the case against future non-compliant states is put in terms of proven safeguards violations 
. . . it will probably result in a tougher response.”); Ian Johnstone, Legislation and Adjudica-
tion in the UN Security Council: Bringing Down the Deliberative Deficit, 102 Am. J. Int’l L. 
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tend to deal in types of evidence that are less speculative and more 
physical and scientific, such as traces of highly-enriched uranium and 
technical documentation of weapons programs, an issue discussed below 
in Part III. In addition, this evidence’s origination or compilation in a 
widely endorsed, multilateral process confers to it substantial credibility 
and legitimacy,172 such that a disbelieving state may find itself on the 
wrong side of overwhelming consensus. Other evidentiary indicators 
generally do not enjoy these advantages, and so may be incapable of 
generating the consensus necessary to animate a conservative Security 
Council.173 
But the traditional view’s heavy reliance on auxiliary mechanisms 
for assessing capabilities can create counterproductive incentives for 
proliferators to confound and otherwise “game” these processes. If ques-
tions of state capability must be resolved primarily through these 
procedures, frustration of the procedures can enhance the security of 
WMD programs by preventing the satisfaction of a legal condition 
precedent to the use of countervailing force. This is a critical pitfall of 
the process approach, not just because it may lead to undesirable inac-
tion and facilitate WMD development, but because it may increase 
capability uncertainty, by incentivizing obfuscation, instead of reducing 
it. Part III discusses some ways to address these issues, guided by analy-
sis of objective standards. 
Inspections and other investigative techniques used to inform U.N. 
Security Council decisionmaking provide abundant opportunities for 
their subjects to act strategically and heighten uncertainty. Iraq’s ap-
proximately thirty-year history with international nonproliferation 
processes illustrates these different forms of manipulation and the pit-
falls of over-reliance on process.174  
                                                                                                                      
275, 296 (2008) (describing the Security Council’s reliance on an outside, commissioned 
study in deciding proper standards regarding the listing and delisting of targeted individuals 
under the provisions of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1267).  
 172. See generally Nina Srinivasan Rathbun, The Role of Legitimacy in Strengthening 
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime, 13 Nonproliferation Rev. 227 (2006) (discussing the 
importance of legitimacy in developing and strengthening multilateral non-proliferation insti-
tutions). 
 173. See Acton, supra note 87, at 129 (“States are likely to decide upon enforcement 
actions on the merits of the case, rather than on the basis of self-interest, if the salient factors 
are those that can be reliably and accurately assessed by the IAEA.”). 
 174. See generally David Albright, Masters of Deception, 54 Bull. Atomic Scientists, 
May–June 1998, at 44; Geoffrey Forden, Intention to Deceive: Iraqi Misdirection of UN In-
spectors, Jane’s Intelligence Rev., Mar. 1 2004, at 30; Khidhir Hamza, Inside Saddam’s 
Secret Nuclear Program, 54 Bull. Atomic Scientists, Sept.–Oct. 1998, at 26; Kay, supra 
note 63, at 85; Yang Ruifu, Biological Inspections in Iraq: Lessons for BWC Compliance and 
Verification, in Beijing on Biohazards: Chinese Experts on Bioweapons Nonprolif-
eration Issues 91 (Amy E. Smithson ed., 2007); Wilhelm Unge & Hans Furustig, 
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As one pair of scholars put it, “[n]o other state has been so intru-
sively inspected and thoroughly monitored by the UN.”175 Yet Iraq 
employed its ultimate authority over inspectors’ physical mobility to its 
advantage, creating tactical delays in transportation, disallowing and in-
timidating disfavored inspectors, and often flagrantly restricting access 
to facilities.176 Even when inspectors were able to penetrate some of this 
deception and uncover sensitive materials, they often were unable to 
avoid alerting the Iraqi regime or prevent the ensuing large-scale destruc-
tion of evidence.177 Perhaps more troubling in terms of the capability 
uncertainty problem were Iraq’s active deceptions, frequently in the form 
of interminable half-truths and strategic disclosure.178 As its last exercise 
in manipulating uncertainty, Iraq worried in late 2002 that the indetermi-
nacy of U.N. processes no longer provided an effective check on 
individual states and unsuccessfully attempted to create uncertainty by 
promising unrestricted access to U.N. inspectors.179 
Future efforts to discern capabilities through these processes are 
likely to confront a similarly well-practiced response. In the case of Iran, 
for example, in recent years “[t]he Iranians knew that as long as they 
could keep playing three-card monte with the inspectors, they could 
profit from the ambiguities about their program.”180 North Korea has also 
been exploiting capability uncertainty to confound inspection processes 
over the past two decades.181 
                                                                                                                      
Unravelling Strategies of Deception and Perception in the Iraq Crisis, Jane’s Intelligence 
Rev., May 1, 2006, at 43.  
 175. Unge & Furustig, supra note 174, at 43. 
 176. See, e.g., David A. Kay, Former Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelli-
gence on Strategy Regarding Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs, Testimony Before 
the Senate Armed Services Committee 108th Cong. (Jan. 28, 2004), available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2004/US/01/28/kay.transcript/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2009); Paul Lewis, 
Iraqis Fire to Bar UN Inspectors; ‘We Can’t Allow This,’ Bush Says, N.Y. Times, June 29, 
1991, at A1. 
 177. See Albright, supra note 174, at 46. 
 178. These forms of deception assumed increased importance in the period after the Gulf 
War, when singular conditions led to an inspections regime that reduced the sovereign control 
retained by Iraq to historically unprecedented levels. See Jonathan B. Tucker, Monitoring and 
Verification in a Non-Cooperative Environment: Lessons from the U.N. Experience in Iraq, 
Nonproliferation Rev., Spring–Summer 1996, at 1, 2, 6. Examples include the post-1991 
Gulf War investigations into Iraq’s centrifuge program, during which “Iraq told only part of 
the story and cleverly hid some key information within otherwise truthful revelations” and 
crafted disclosures to create a false perception of its actual suppliers of crucial technical assis-
tance. See Albright, supra note 174, at 49–50. 
 179. Kevin Woods et al., Iraqi Perspectives Project: A View of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom from Saddam’s Senior Leadership 93 (2006), available at http://www.jfcom.mil/ 
newslink/storyarchive/2006/ipp.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2009). 
 180. David E. Sanger, The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts and the 
Challenges to American Power 90–91 (2009); see also Jahn, supra note 80 (discussing 
recent inspection stonewalling by both Syria and Iran). 
 181. See Sanger, supra note 180, at 315–35, 339–42. 
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It is telling that after persistent deployment of sophisticated and in-
trusive fact-finding missions, the status of Iraq’s WMD capabilities 
remained so uncertain that many of the world’s sophisticated intelligence 
services had formed grossly inaccurate judgments.182 Besides casting 
doubt on the unilateralist approach, this history and eventual outcome 
should also caution against future over-reliance on fact-finding processes 
of the type especially likely to be relied upon under the traditional view. 
As David Kay, former chief U.N. weapons inspector, writes, 
[a] deception campaign that results in bureaucratic paralysis 
through uncertainty or disagreements as to capabilities and in-
tentions will often be sufficient to obtain a state’s objective—it 
will not need to reach the higher “gold” standard of widespread 
belief in the deception.183  
This suggests that improvements in inspection processes and counter-
deception may be of limited value or may create a false sense of secu-
rity.184  
ii. Legitimacy Concerns 
When its supporters argue that U.N. Security Council assessments of 
capabilities carry greater legitimacy,185 they often use the term “legiti-
macy” as “a function of the perception of those in the community 
concerned that the rule . . . has come into being . . . in accordance with 
right process.”186 But this approach to capability assessment fails to gar-
ner legitimacy in another sense: “the capacity of an international legal 
rule to pull those to whom it is addressed toward consensual compli-
ance.”187 
The principal source of this legitimacy deficiency is the divergence 
between how threatened states and the U.N. Security Council assess 
threats under capability uncertainty, which in turn is rooted in the differ-
ent interests of threatened states and adherents to the traditional view in 
                                                                                                                      
 182. Kay, supra note 176; Kenneth M. Pollack, Spies, Lies, and Weapons: What Went 
Wrong, Atlantic Monthly, Jan.–Feb. 2004, at 78. 
 183. Kay, supra note 63, at 101. 
 184. See Hans Blix, Developing International Law and Inducing Compliance, 41 
Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 1, 12 (2002) (“When cooperation with inspectors is limited , . . . 
[s]uch inspection may risk lulling neighbors and the world into a false confidence . . . . Cos-
metic inspection may be worse than none.”). 
 185. See supra notes 153–157 and accompanying text. 
 186. Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 Am. J. Int’l. L. 
705, 711 (1988); see also Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sover-
eignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements 118, 127 (1995). 
 187. Franck, supra note 103, at 93 (citing his earlier work, Thomas M. Franck, The 
Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (1990)). 
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considering assessments. If a state strongly believes it faces an actual 
WMD threat and has formed this belief through a reliable evidentiary 
assessment, but is unable to obtain the U.N. Security Council’s blessing, 
its leaders are unlikely to accept inaction as a sacrifice necessary to pre-
vent future false positives and preserve the norm of nonintervention. 
Philip Bobbitt identifies this problem when he argues that “[a]t present, 
the rule of law is eroding because the prevailing doctrines of interna-
tional law are radically insufficient to regulate the efforts of states that 
must cope with global, networked terrorism, and with the related threats 
of weapons of mass destruction, genocide, and overwhelming civilian 
catastrophes.”188 
This problem is aggravated by the absence of transparent criteria to 
guide the U.N. Security Council’s threat assessments. The U.N. High-
Level Panel recognized the legitimacy cost of standardless U.N. Security 
Council decisionmaking generally, arguing that, in its use of force 
judgments, “the Council should adopt and systematically address a set of 
agreed guidelines” to promote “the common perception of their 
legitimacy—their being made on solid evidentiary grounds, and for the 
right reasons.”189 The argument applies with equal force to the 
capabilities component of U.N. Security Council decisions. Crucially, 
when the Security Council declines to authorize the use of force against 
an asserted WMD threat, it may often be impossible to determine 
whether its judgment was based on doubt with respect to capabilities, 
intentions, insufficient exhaustion of non-forcible means, or some 
combination of concerns, and the underlying reasons for finding a 
deficiency in any of these areas may be even less clear. Compliance by 
threatened states with a rigid process is even less likely where the 
reasons for an adverse decision are ambiguous or suspected of being 
rooted in others’ self-interests.190  
Adherents to the traditional view hope that these concerns can be 
mitigated through improved procedures and greater political commit-
ment toward their collective use by powerful states. But the recent 
practice of states suggests there is a long way to go before states can 
place their precautionary security largely in the hands of collective deci-
sion-making bodies.  
                                                                                                                      
 188. Bobbitt, supra note 58, at 452. 
 189. U.N. High-Level Panel, supra note 59, at 66. 
 190. See generally Johnstone, supra note 171 (discussing the “deliberative deficit” of 
U.N. Security Council decisionmaking, and proposing ways to remedy it).  
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2. The Unilateralist View: A Subjective Standards Approach 
As an alternative to the traditional view, the unilateralist view relies 
on a subjective standard for judging WMD capabilities and threats:191 
Does a state in good faith perceive sufficient threat of WMD attack from 
an adversary state? States may rely on their independent judgments 
about the capabilities and threats posed by others.  
This view accepts uncertainty and ambiguity as an inherent feature 
of intelligence.192 In its 2006 National Security Strategy, the Bush ad-
ministration reiterated that the United States would “not rule out the use 
of force before attacks occur, even if uncertainty remains as to the time 
and place of the enemy’s attack.”193 It went on to note that “there will 
always be some uncertainty about the status of hidden programs.”194 
Donald Rumsfeld echoed this view in testimony to the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, cautioning against “mistak[ing] intelligence for 
irrefutable evidence” and bluntly telling the Committee that “intelligence 
will never be perfect,” while arguing that demands for unrealistic cer-
tainty in intelligence risk curtailing the flow of intelligence to 
decisionmakers.195  
a. Advantages 
Under the unilateralist view, threat assessments made by multilateral 
bodies like the United Nations carry an unacceptable risk of 
underestimation, given the relatively greater weight they assign to false 
negatives in the WMD context.196 Moreover, in keeping with its roots in 
realist and interventionist theory, the unilateralist view considers the 
factual  
                                                                                                                      
 191. See Doyle, supra note 20, at 26 (“There is another problem with allowing one state 
to adopt a standard that is as subjective and open-ended as the Bush administration’s identifi-
cation of threats.”); Rivkin, Jr. et al., supra note 118, at 496 (“[T]he principle of anticipatory 
self-defense does not, and has never, required that the threat have been genuine—only that it 
be perceived to be so in good faith.”); see also Bolton, supra note 128, at 438 (“Saddam’s 
regime itself constituted a threat to peace and our security, whether or not imminent, and that 
alone was a compelling justification to eliminate it.”); Kerry, supra note 123, at 2188 (assert-
ing a unilateral right to determine if threats justify force); Lee, supra note 110, at 159 (stating 
that, to a realist, “[a]ny preemptive war based on a subjectively reasonable perception of threat 
is a lawful war”). 
 192. Cf. Roger D. Carstens, Less than Perfect Intelligence: A Leader Must Decide With-
out All the Facts, Wash. Times, Oct. 31, 2003, at A23. 
 193. See The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States 
of America 23 (Mar. 2006). 
 194. Id. at 24. 
 195. Donald Rumsfeld, Sec’y of Defense, Remarks on Intelligence, Remarks before the 
Senate Armed Services Committee, Feb. 4, 2004, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/ 
speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=92 (last visited Oct. 6, 2009).  
 196. See Bolton, supra note 128. 
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appraisal of emerging threats to be inalienably committed to individual 
states’ discretion.197  
In response to the criticism that this subjective standard could lead to 
overestimation of threatening capabilities and the unconstrained use of 
force, proponents of the unilateralist view sometimes point to several 
checks inherent in a state’s decision to use anticipatory force. For one, 
the possibility that undetected weapons could be used in retaliation or 
during armed conflicts requires leaders to develop the most accurate in-
telligence feasible and refrain from using force unless they perceive the 
risks of doing so as outweighed by risks of inaction. This is the reason-
ing embodied in Michael Glennon’s stipulation that “[a] reliable 
assessment of likely costs is an essential precondition to any preemptive 
action.”198 
In addition, because the success of a military action may depend 
upon domestic and (depending on which unilateralist view advocate you 
ask) international support, political pressures may impose higher epis-
temic standards on a state’s capability judgments.199 In the domestic 
realm, Daniel Pipes explains: 
I have endorsed preemption, both in the abstract and as applied 
to the Iraqi dictator. But in doing so, I am aware of its special 
difficulties: error is likely, and uncertainty is inescapable. . . . 
These difficulties place special responsibility on a government 
that preempts. It must act in as transparent a manner as possible, 
without guile. It must first establish the validity of its actions to 
its own citizenry. Second, because Americans heed so much 
what others think, the opinion of the targeted country’s popula-
tion also matters, as does the opinion of other key countries.200  
                                                                                                                      
 197. See, e.g., Richard Pipes, Defending and Advancing Freedom: A Symposium, 120 
Commentary 21, 56 (2005) (“A country’s security is not the subject of discussion by others. 
The United Nations has no inherent right to decide whether the U.S. is threatened and how it 
is to react to the threat. Sovereignty implies both the right and the duty to protect one’s citi-
zens.”); Robert Bork, The Limits of International Law, Nat’l Int., Winter 1989–90, at 3; see 
also Michael J. Glennon, Limits of Law, Prerogatives of Power: Interventionism 
After Kosovo 204 (2001) (“[W]hatever its practical difficulties, states have come to employ 
a cost-benefit approach, rather than seek guidance from the scholastic legalist alternative, for 
the simple reason that they see it as relying upon reality rather than myth.”). 
 198. Michael J. Glennon, Preempting Terrorism: The Case for Anticipatory Self-Defense, 
7 Wkly. Standard, Jan. 28, 2002, at 24. 
 199. See Rivkin, Jr. et al., supra note 118, at 491 (“[D]uring the September 2004 presi-
dential debates, Senator John Kerry declared that any American President would use 
preemptive strikes, if necessary. The contrast between him and President Bush was over the 
circumstances in which preemption could be employed.”).  
 200. Pipes, supra note 197, at 54. 
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While there is greater disagreement among unilateralist view propo-
nents on the relevance of international support to the success of 
precautionary use of force, it is generally accepted that any benefits pos-
sibly deriving from international support are contingent on the epistemic 
strength of the supporting capability assessments.201 In analyzing the im-
pact of the intelligence failures of the Iraq War, one staunch defender of 
the Bush Administration’s preemption doctrine has observed that 
“[b]ecause a policy of preemption is so dependent on accurate intelli-
gence, the international community will question the legitimacy of any 
future preemptive action by the United States (or any other nation).”202 
For repeat players like the United States, the lasting costs of false posi-
tives are immense, serving as a check on over-estimation.  
In sum, the unilateralist view holds that individual states are best po-
sitioned to manage the challenges of capability uncertainty and calibrate 
the appropriate level of force in this context, as (i) some degree of capa-
bility uncertainty inheres in every justifiable use of force, (ii) threatened 
states are best qualified to balance the uncertainties because they bear 
the risks of both action and inaction, (iii) ceding any authority for capa-
bility appraisal to other entities creates an unacceptable risk of false 
negatives and impermissibly delegates fundamental state responsibili-
ties,203 and (iv) domestic and international political pressures are 
sufficient checks on states’ epistemic processes.  
                                                                                                                      
 201. See Sanger, supra note 180, at 70–73 (discussing this perspective among Bush 
administration officials in the aftermath of Iraq). At a 2005 press conference, President Bush 
was asked whether intelligence failures in Iraq undermined the government’s ability to deal 
with other threats, such as Iran and North Korea. He responded: “[W]here it is going to be 
most difficult to make the case is in the public arena. People will say, ‘If we’re trying to make 
the case on Iran, well, the intelligence failed in Iraq; therefore, how can we trust the intelli-
gence on Iran?’ ” President’s News Conference, 41 Wkly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1885, 1892 (Dec. 
19, 2005). Bush continued: “[T]hat case of making—beginning to say to the Iranians, ‘There 
are consequences for not behaving,’ requires people to believe that the Iranian nuclear pro-
gram is, to a certain extent, ongoing . . . . [I]t’s no question that the credibility of intelligence 
is necessary for good diplomacy.” Id. 
 202. Larry M. Wortzel, Vice President & Dir., The Kathryn & Shelby Cullom Davis Inst. 
for Int’l Stud., The Heritage Found., Testimony Before the House Armed Services Committee 
Regarding Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, Mar. 17, 2004, available at http:// 
armedservices.house.gov/comdocs/openingstatementsandpressreleases/108thcongress/04-03-
17wortzel.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2009). 
 203. See generally John Bolton, Under Sec’y for Arms Control & Int’l Sec., U.S. Dep’t 
of State, Address to the 2003 National Lawyers Convention of the Federalist Society (Nov. 13, 
2003), available at http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20070324_bolton.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 
2009). 
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b. Drawbacks204 
i. Accuracy Concerns 
The unilateralist view’s central problem in calibrating the use of 
force under capability uncertainty lies in its failure to differentiate reli-
able and unreliable epistemic approaches to assessing potential threats. 
Momentarily leaving aside the prospect of pretextual capability apprais-
als, the most worrisome type of unreliable approach involves treating 
high-impact threats as cause for military action, even when there is little 
evidence indicating the threat will be realized or when the available evi-
dence suggests a very low probability of occurrence. An example is the 
“one-percent doctrine” ascribed to former Vice President Dick Cheney, 
whereby he stated that “[w]ith a low-probability, high-impact event like 
this . . . [i]f there’s a one percent chance that Pakistani scientists are 
helping al Qaeda build or develop a nuclear weapon, we have to treat it 
as a certainty in terms of our response.”205 
While this type of approach might be most vividly associated with 
the Bush administration, there are reasons to believe state decisionmak-
ers generally may be disposed to evaluate threats in this manner. For one, 
WMD threats represent some of the greatest security risks to states, and 
their “[c]atastrophic consequences lower the threshold at which leaders 
must take the unlikely seriously.”206 Political science studies suggest that 
leaders’ willingness to accept a risk in undertaking military action is in-
creased when the decision is framed in terms of potential losses.207 And 
                                                                                                                      
 204. I do not repeat here the legal arguments made previously, including that the text of 
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter could be read to restrict self-defense to cases in which an 
“armed attack” has occurred. See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text. I focus instead 
here on the policy rationales behind different doctrinal approaches. 
 205. Ron Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America’s Pursuit of 
Its Enemies Since 9/11, at 61–62 (2006) (quoting then Vice President Dick Cheney). 
 206. Jonathan Renshon, Why Leaders Choose War: The Psychology of Preven-
tion 163 (2006). Former Prime Minister Tony Blair’s public statements after the Iraq war are 
also telling here. For example: 
Here is the crux. It is possible that even with all of this, nothing would have hap-
pened. Possible that Saddam would change his ambitions; possible he would 
develop the WMD but never use it; possible that the terrorists would never get their 
hands on WMD, whether from Iraq or elsewhere. We cannot be certain. Perhaps we 
would have found different ways of reducing it . . . . But do we want to take the 
risk? That is the judgement. And my judgement then and now is that the risk of this 
new global terrorism and its interaction with states or organisations or individuals 
proliferating WMD, is one I simply am not prepared to run. 
Prime Minister Tony Blair, Speech on the Threat of Global Terrorism (Mar. 5, 2004), avail-
able at http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page5461 (last visited Oct. 6, 2009).  
 207. See Jack S. Levy, An Introduction to Prospect Theory, 13 Pol. Psychol. 171, 171–
72 (1992).  
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as one scholar notes in analyzing states’ decisions to use anticipatory 
force, in the WMD context “[a]ny discussion of preventive war is inher-
ently framed in terms of losses. By the time leaders have decided to 
consider preventive action, they have already framed the issue in terms 
of something bad that may happen in the future, that is, they are in the 
domain of losses.”208 More generally, decisionmakers’ perceptions of 
their primary obligation as the protectors of their nations are likely to 
lower their threshold for actionable certainty.209  
It is clearly undesirable for states to predicate high-risk military ac-
tion on low probabilities or on thin evidence of a threat. Wars are 
notoriously fraught with unintended consequences, and military actions 
designed to counter dubious threats risk creating more dangers than they 
eliminate. Cass Sunstein summarizes the general problem as follows: 
In the context of national security, an aggressive response to a 1 
percent threat may create a new threat, perhaps higher than 1 
percent, of producing its own disaster. A preemptive war, de-
signed to eliminate a small risk of a terrible outcome, might 
create larger risks of a different but also terrible outcome.210 
Among these hazardous collateral effects, the risk of a systemic in-
crease in conflict from widespread use of a legally sanctioned 
“precautionary principle” is particularly worrisome.211 Describing this 
danger, Doyle writes that “other states will claim an equivalent right to 
act on their equivalently arbitrary threat suspicions, which ultimately 
would be an invitation to chaos . . . . Every state will be preempting 
every other state’s preventive strikes.”212  
Here, the problem is not that the use of a subjective standard always 
entails the use of a “one-percent doctrine” approach to threat assessment 
and anticipatory military action, but that the standard accepts this ap-
proach and places it on equal legal footing with more robust 
assessments, rather than creating the countervailing pressure we want 
from use of force regulation. Even more worrying to some, “[t]he ‘sub-
jectivation’ of the standards of legal restraints on the use of force . . . is 
the first step on a slippery slope. The content of those standards will no 
longer be discernible. This loose construction of the right to unilaterally 
                                                                                                                      
 208. Renshon, supra note 206, at 146 (emphasis in original). 
 209. See Patrick Hubbard, A Realist Response to Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars, in In-
tervention, Terrorism, and Torture: Contemporary Challenges to Just War 
Theory 59, 65 (Steven P. Lee ed., 2007) (“[L]eaders address this risk and uncertainty by 
focusing on their concrete, specific obligation to protect their citizens and, in effect, placing 
less value on their more general duty to respect the rights of enemy citizens.”). 
 210. Sunstein, supra note 15, at 4. 
 211. See Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, The Risk Society at War 91–140 (2006). 
 212. Doyle, supra note 20, at 26. 
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use force would undermine the very existence of the prohibition . . . .”213 
If one purpose of a legal framework in this area is to discourage the use 
of irresponsible epistemic processes under uncertainty and reward the 
responsible, a system that fails to distinguish first between the reliable 
and unreliable will not satisfy this goal. 
Moreover, from the perspective of a target state, if another state’s 
decision to use force is not subject to any external constraints on judg-
ments, then there remains little incentive to consent to the kind of 
inspections and disclosures that under another system might lower the 
target state’s chances of being attacked. Threats of force can complement 
inspection regimes and encourage compliance, but threats are more ef-
fective if compliance carries an expected security benefit that outweighs 
the security cost of inspections.214 As a result, a subjective standard could 
undermine some promising mechanisms for reducing capability uncer-
tainty and the destabilization it produces.  
ii. Legitimacy Concerns 
The unilateralist view’s subjective standard is unlikely to give the 
impression that a particular threat assessment or use of force is the prod-
uct of “right process.”215 Instead, it creates just the opposite impression: 
that a state refuses to abide by assessments reached through universally 
respected or pre-agreed procedures.216 To those adhering to the traditional 
view, unilateral assessment and application of precautionary force strips 
it of legitimacy:  
The problem that the invasion of Iraq has brought to the fore is 
not primarily one of defining or reforming a right to anticipatory, 
preemptive, or preventive self-defense in the era of WMDs, 
daunting as such a project may be. The problem is that, even if 
such a commonly acceptable right could be formulated, by treaty 
or by practice, it would be wholly illegitimate so long as some 
nations insisted on the right to interpret and apply the new rule 
unilaterally.217 
As Richard Falk notes, “[t]he doctrine of preemption, as such, is less 
troublesome than its unilateral application in circumstances where the 
                                                                                                                      
 213. Public Sitting, Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. Pleadings 1, 37 (Feb. 19, 
2003) (quoting the Verbatim Record of the Presentation by Michael Bothe on behalf of Iran), 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/90/5137.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2009). 
 214. See Blix, supra note 184, at 9–10; see also Byman & Waxman, supra note 3, at 11 
(“When considering a coercer’s threat, an adversary looks at costs associated with continued 
resistance versus costs associated with complying with the coercer’s demands.”).  
 215. Franck, supra note 186. 
 216. Reisman & Armstrong, supra note 102, at 526. 
 217. Franck, supra note 103, at 102. 
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burden of persuasion as to the imminence and severity of the threat is not 
sustained.”218 
The lack of legitimacy associated with unilateral capability assess-
ments carries important practical disadvantages. Most obviously, a use of 
force predicated on a perceived-illegitimate assessment is unlikely to 
garner the international support that may be important to the success of 
the intervention.219 This leads some strategists to conclude that “stronger 
agreed factual predicates will help generate support for action and 
strengthen legitimacy. For many . . . anxiety about the preventive use of 
force and WMD [is] attributable to the debacle over the Iraq intelligence 
. . . .”220 This could, in turn, be addressed through more robust interna-
tional processes: “Strong, ideally international, fact finding could help 
address the problem by strengthening both the authority and capabilities 
(especially of inspection and analysis) of organizations such as the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency and the Organization for the Prohibition 
of Chemical Weapons.”221 
These critiques of the unilateralist view naturally strengthen calls for 
stronger international legal process. But they also raise the question of 
whether objective standards can remedy problems of untethered subjec-
tivity without exclusive reliance on procedural stringency. 
3. The Reasonable Necessity View:  
An Objective Standards Approach 
The reasonable necessity view uses an objective standard for judging 
WMD capabilities and threats: Would a reasonably cautious state have 
acted in self-defense on the basis of the available evidence and its epis-
temic strength?222 In assessing reasonableness, the reasonable necessity 
view seeks to identify factors that a reasonable state would consider in 
evaluating a potential threat under capability uncertainty.  
The reasonable necessity view calibrates the risks of false positives 
and false negatives through different channels than the traditional and 
unilateralist views. Each of the latter strikes its balance primarily 
                                                                                                                      
 218. Richard A. Falk, What Future for the UN Charter System of War Prevention?, 97 
Am. J. Int’l L. 590, 595 (2003). 
 219. See Hart & Fedchenko, supra note 80, at 112; Reisman & Armstrong, supra note 
102, n.79; Gregory F. Treverton, Intelligence: The Achilles Heel of the Bush Doctrine, Arms 
Control Today, July–Aug. 2003, at 1, available at http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1338 
(last visited Oct. 6, 2009). 
 220. James B. Steinberg, Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Use of Force, in Beyond 
Preemption, supra note 48, at 19, 36 (emphasis omitted). 
 221. Id. 
 222. See Schmitt, supra note 46, at 113 (“Ultimately, an adequacy assessment will rest 
on the international community’s determination of whether a reasonable international actor 
would have acted in self-defense on the basis of the evidence in question.”). 
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through the location of decisional authority (in the U.N. Security Coun-
cil and in individual states, respectively), giving comparatively little 
attention to the substance of the internal logic through which those deci-
sional authorities reach judgments.223 In a reasonable necessity system, 
that logic is paramount. Capability assessments guided by objective cri-
teria and evidentiary rules are the core of this approach, and their 
particular configuration will be the principal determinant of how the 
risks of different errors are balanced. Instead of assigning capability as-
sessments to an entity in the expectation that its incentives and 
characteristics will produce judgments that approximate the desired bal-
ance of risks, a reasonable necessity regime conducts this balancing 
largely through the substantive criteria themselves. This is not to deny 
the influence of decisional authority on outcomes, but as a method for 
optimizing the balance of risks it is secondary to the substantive criteria 
and epistemic analysis those authorities are tasked with applying. 
a. Advantages  
Taking this approach to managing false positives and false negatives 
should help address accuracy concerns by enhancing the transparency of 
the balancing determination, allowing for feedback as law evolves to 
deal effectively with evolving threats and conditions. Under unilateralist 
and traditional approaches, institutional mechanisms mediate between 
the desired balance of risks and their actualization, often leaving the 
connection between the policy objective and the outcome unclear. The 
reasonable necessity approach hones in on the balance itself, aiming to 
optimize policy effectiveness in individual cases and over time. As 
Myres McDougal and Florentino Feliciano explained in 1961, “reason-
ableness in particular context does not mean arbitrariness in decision but 
in fact its exact opposite, the disciplined ascription of policy import to 
varying factors in appraising their operational and functional signifi-
cance for community goals in given instances of coercion.”224 Part III, 
below, aims to provide some of that disciplined policy ascription.225 
As to legitimacy, the reasonable necessity view holds promise in 
both the “right process” and “compliance” senses with which Thomas 
Franck uses the term.226 A reasonable necessity framework encourages 
greater consensual compliance through its congruence with the 
considerations and epistemic judgments that a reasonable threatened 
                                                                                                                      
 223. See supra notes 149, 191 and accompanying text. 
 224. Myers S. McDougal & Florentino P. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World 
Public Order 218 (1961). 
 225. See infra Part III. 
 226. See supra notes 186–187 and accompanying text. 
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state would employ.227 This increases the likelihood that global, policy-
appropriate uses of precautionary self-defense under capability 
uncertainty would fit within a legal framework, and so it likely excludes 
fewer cases of precautionary self-defense than the traditional view’s 
approach.228 The vitality of the law governing precautionary self-defense 
is dependent upon the ability of this law to adapt to contemporary 
challenges like capability uncertainty in a manner that decisionmakers 
and security professionals perceive as sensible.229 For this task, an 
objective standard is promising, because it directly addresses the same 
judgments these actors are forced to make and assesses them in 
recognizable terms.  
At the same time, an appropriately designed reasonable necessity 
scheme can produce capability assessments and use of force answers that 
appear to result from “right process.” A determination is more likely to be 
viewed as the product of “right process” if the standard used is oriented 
toward the considerations that governments use to evaluate emerging 
threats, and if the way in which these considerations are treated broadly 
tracks these states’ own evaluative processes.230 Moreover, as discussed 
                                                                                                                      
 227. Abraham D. Sofaer, International Law and Kosovo, 36 Stan. J. Int’l L. 1, 16 
(2000) (“If a fact-oriented, reasonableness standard led states to explain themselves in terms 
of the considerations they actually take into account in making use-of-force decisions, and by 
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tional law, Michael Reisman argues: 
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tions in specific contexts; and, of course, the characteristics, objectives, and capacities 
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Reisman, supra note 27, at 82; see also Sofaer, supra note 170, at 549 (“The legal rationale for 
concluding that the Security Council has a monopoly on the lawful use of force grows from a 
mix of arguments that have thus far won the day in international legal circles, even though 
they have no credibility among national security professionals.”). 
 229. See Sapiro, supra note 145, at 602 (“Today it is more likely to be foolish, if not 
suicidal, for a state that believed its fundamental security interests were at risk to wait until the 
first attack. . . . [A] document meant to be universally accepted and to remain relevant must 
also be flexible enough to adapt to changed circumstances.”). 
 230. See Sofaer, supra note 227, at 16 (“[I]f the legal principles involved make sense, 
government decisions are far more likely to be influenced by them than if the standards pur-
port to impose conduct alien to reality and to their decisionmaking processes.”). 
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further below, there are a range of opportunities for a reasonable neces-
sity regime to work in tandem with the U.N. Security Council and other 
institutional processes, especially in clarifying the legitimate policy pri-
orities that guide objective standards.231  
b. Drawbacks 
Supporters of the traditional view are quick to object to the reason-
able necessity view along the following lines: In practice, the reasonable 
necessity view collapses into the unilateralist view, at least when applied 
outside of the U.N. Security Council, and so the traditional view remains 
the only available framework to stave off the unconstrained use of force 
by states.232 For Franck, 
[t]he more indeterminate a norm, the more essential the process 
by which, in practice, the norm can be made more specific. 
Rules that each member of a community is free to interpret for 
itself, without fear of definitive contradiction, are truly rules 
lacking in determinacy, for they leave each member free to assert 
that “the rules are whatever I say they are.” They then have no 
objective content whatsoever.233 
One might be especially concerned about the slide from objective 
standards to subjectivity in the area of international self-defense law 
because there is no single “reasonable state” akin to the hypothesized 
“reasonable person” of many domestic law contexts.234 Vast disparities in 
power, wealth, prestige, interests, and political systems make it 
impossible to discern a single, universal standard. Instead the question 
becomes: How would a reasonable state in the position of the one 
claiming a right to use force act? That is hard to answer without delving 
into the complex strategic calculus of individual state decisionmaking.235  
Harold Koh argues in response to Michael Doyle that “[Doyle’s 
proposed] standards are just too easily manipulated by those who want 
to use military force.”236 As a result, the unilateral application of objec-
tive reasonableness criteria will devolve into the same unreliable 
epistemic tendencies that the reasonable necessity view seeks to 
                                                                                                                      
 231. See discussion infra Part II.B.4. 
 232. See Franck, supra note 103, at 101–05.  
 233. Id. at 102. 
 234. See Seyom Brown, The Illusion of Control: Force and Foreign Policy in 
the Twenty-First Century 113 (2003); Fletcher & Ohlin, supra note 129, at 173–74. 
 235. See generally David Kaye, Adjudicating Self-Defense: Discretion, Perception, and 
the Resort to Force in International Law, 44 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 134 (2005) (discussing 
difficulties of judging the reasonableness of state decisionmaking, especially amid crises). 
 236. Harold Hongju Koh, Comment, in Doyle, supra note 20, at 101, 112–13.  
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avoid.237 Koh concludes that “[i]f we want to create a meaningful default 
position against unwarranted use of force, in these emergency situations, 
we need bright-line rules.”238 
Michael Bothe similarly argues that whatever the intuitive appeal of a 
reasonableness approach to regulating force in theory, in practice it 
“open[s] the door to arbitrariness and subjectivity.”239 As to the counter-
risks, “[i]t may be that the risk of violation is higher if the rule is very 
restrictive,” and “[i]t may well be that the international community, re-
shaping the opinio iuris, will one day accept some instances of 
pre-emptive use of force.”240 But, Bothe concludes, the traditional ap-
proach “is a much safer approach to the interpretation and development of 
the ius ad bellum than loosening any real restraint by boiling it down to a 
rule of reason—a self-destructive mechanism for the prohibition of the 
use of force.”241 
These dangers are quite real, but one limitation of this objection is 
its uneven application of assumptions about state compliance with inter-
national law. In considering how a reasonable necessity approach would 
operate in a real-world situation, the traditional view assumes standards 
will be exploited by its users to justify aggression but fails to explain 
satisfactorily how the traditional view will fare better in restraining states 
                                                                                                                      
 237.  
[T]he result is that when there is even a scintilla of evidence of a looming threat, 
you must assume that it is a high probability; and that even if there is no evidence 
of even a 1 percent probability, that is not evidence of the absence of sufficient 
provocation to warrant attacking preemptively, and with overwhelming force. When 
such a collective mind-set prevails, evidence quickly gives way to hunches, intui-
tions, or gut instincts, with tragic consequences should those hunches prove 
unfounded. 
Id. at 108. 
 238. Id. at 114; see also Henkin, supra note 26, at 60: 
In our decentralized international political system with primitive institutions and 
underdeveloped law enforcement machinery, it is important that Charter norms—
which go to the heart of international order and implicate war and peace in the nu-
clear age—be clear, sharp, and comprehensive; as independent as possible of 
judgments of degree and of issues of fact; as invulnerable as can be to self-serving 
interpretations and to temptations to conceal, distort, or mischaracterize events. 
Id. 
 239. Michael Bothe, Terrorism and the Legality of Pre-Emptive Force, 14 Eur. J. Int’l 
L. 227, 239 (2003). 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id.; see also Franck, supra note 103, at 102 (“The more indeterminate a norm, the 
more essential the process by which, in practice, the norm can be made more specific. Rules 
that each member of a community is free to interpret for itself . . . have no objective content 
whatsoever.”). 
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that are determined to use force aggressively.242 This problem afflicts the 
traditional view or any regulatory scheme that depends on decentralized 
international enforcement, even if it includes centralized adjudication. In 
the absence of powerful centralized enforcement, any international legal 
regime will have to operate under these limitations. It remains unproven 
whether inflexible bright-line rules are better suited to the task,243 espe-
cially when critical facts remain subject to debate among key 
international actors.  
The principal targets of use of force rules are not limited to actors 
determined to disregard international law or wedded to faulty capability 
assessments. In relation to these actors, each of the three approaches is 
likely to fare poorly in constraining uses of force. Use of force rules 
should also be geared to those who may be susceptible to their pull and 
designed to maximize the scope of their influence. A reasonable neces-
sity approach is superior on that count, because good faith 
decisionmakers are likely to respect legal standards they view as ration-
ally related to appropriate policy concerns.244 Or as Reisman puts it: 
Until the installation of an effective world constitutive process, 
which will remove the need to rely upon unilateral action for the 
achievement of key international goals, it will be for the college 
of international lawyers to establish criteria for the lawfulness of 
the initiation and application of unilateral anticipatory and pre-
emptive defensive actions. Their lodestar will be the legitimacy 
of self-defense insofar as it is implemented in accordance with 
the venerable policies of necessity, proportionality, and dis-
crimination. But because the context has changed, the legal 
arrangements to implement these policies of international law 
must change as well. Legal creativity and factual realism in this 
area are called for in equally urgent measure, for if the effective-
ness and soundness of a future international regime about the 
unilateral use of force remain clouded in uncertainty, the insuffi-
ciency of the inherited regime, which was designed for a context 
                                                                                                                      
 242. As Sofaer points out, “[s]tates prepared to use force in bad faith are undeterred by 
restrictive legal rules.” Sofaer, supra note 45, at 225. 
 243. See Reisman, supra note 27, at 90 (“[T]he potential for abuse here does not derive 
from the power of a single state. Rather, it inheres in a legal system that continues to maintain 
weak central institutions and accordingly reserves to each state . . . to engage in unilateral 
action when necessary for its self-defense.”). 
 244. See Sofaer, supra note 45, at 225 (arguing that “[s]tatesmen acting in good faith to 
protect their nations do not take artificial rules seriously,” but instead “they are more likely to 
respect standards rationally related to concerns they recognize as appropriate”). 
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of weapons and adversaries that has changed forever, is certain 
beyond peradventure.245 
All this speaks to the larger issue of identifying the channels through 
which we can expect international regulation of force to influence real-
world outcomes. A further cause for concern is therefore that in practice, 
objective standards slide toward unilateral subjectivity because the rea-
sonable necessity approach lacks clear decisional authority: from where 
are the reasonableness standards derived and by whom and where are 
they applied? Under the traditional view, the U.N. Security Council is 
obviously the legal decisional authority; under the unilateralist view, this 
role is played by the individual state. What is the legal decisional author-
ity for articulating and applying objective standards under the reasonable 
necessity approach? 
A major part of the answer is that for objective standards, like much 
of international law, articulation, application, and enforcement are de-
centralized. “International law is still largely a decentralized process, in 
which much lawmaking (particularly for the most innovative matters) is 
initiated by unilateral claim, whether explicit or behavioral.”246 Legal 
claims are then evaluated through expressions of states and, increasingly, 
through international organizations and non-governmental actors, includ-
ing scholars and other opinion shapers.247 From a legal process 
standpoint, Abram Chayes made a similar point in analyzing the Cuban 
Missile Crisis when he explained that “the requirement of justification 
suffuses the basic process of choice. There is a continuous feedback be-
tween the knowledge that the government will be called upon to justify 
its action and the kind of action that can be chosen.”248 Especially “[i]n 
the context of international law relating to the use of military force, law 
is best seen as a means of predicting global reactions to a proposed use 
                                                                                                                      
 245. Reisman, supra note 27, at 90. 
 246. Id. at 82. 
 247. See W. Michael Reisman & James E. Baker, Regulating Covert Action: 
Practices, Contexts, and Policies of Covert Coercion Abroad in International and 
American Law 17 (1992) (“By law we mean the expectations that politically relevant actors 
in a system share concerning what is the correct way of apportioning and using power, of 
producing and distributing particular desired values, and of shaping certain events, in particu-
lar circumstances.”); W. Michael Reisman, International Incidents: Introduction to a New 
Genre in the Study of International Law, in International Incidents: The Law that 
Counts in World Politics 3, 15 (W. Michael Reisman & Andrew R. Willard eds., 1988) (“If 
law is to be found in significant part in the application of norms to particular cases and con-
troversies, it is plain that such applications in international politics must be sought in a much 
wider range of arenas than the highly formalized and structured judicial fora of domestic sys-
tems.”). 
 248. Abram Chayes, The Cuban Missile Crisis: International Crises and the 
Role of Law 103 (1974). 
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of such force.”249 That is, “when a lawyer says that a proposed course of 
action would be unlawful, the lawyer is really saying that in the past, 
international society has decided that such an action is wrongful and, in 
similar circumstances, will likely do so again.”250 This is not to say that 
legality is merely about winning public support, but that it depends heav-
ily on the ability to defend action in terms of generalized principles.251 
Chayes continues: 
Some of the characteristics of law give it special importance for 
public justification. Because of the scope and variety of the 
audiences addressed, that process must proceed in terms of more 
or less universal and generalized criteria. . . . Legal principles 
also are regarded as quasi-universal or at least generally 
accepted. They are thus well adapted to the needs of public 
justification. On the other hand, because of the very prominence 
of legal standards as criteria for public accounting, failure to 
justify on these grounds or an inadequate legal defence may 
compromise the justification exercise over-all.252 
It is this public accounting that the reasonable necessity standards aim to 
improve.253  
4. Process and Objective Standards: Potential Symbiosis of the 
Traditional View and Reasonable Necessity View 
All of this is not to suggest that objective reasonableness standards 
and use of process to manage capability uncertainty are mutually exclu-
sive. Quite the contrary. There are a number of ways in which the two 
should be complementary. This Section examines the opportunities for 
productive interaction in two respects: an objective reasonableness 
framework’s relationship with “auxiliary” processes and its relationship 
with the U.N. Security Council system.  
                                                                                                                      
 249. Murphy, supra note 6, at 704. 
 250. Id. 
 251. See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 186, at 118–19 (“A crucial element in the proc-
ess by which international norms operate to control conduct, is that, as a matter of 
international practice, questionable action must be explained and justified . . . . ”); see also 
Johnstone, supra note 167, at 440–41 (discussing the importance of justification processes in 
international relations). 
 252. Chayes, supra note 248, at 103–04; see also Chayes & Chayes, supra note 186, at 
120. 
 253. Although not discussed in this paper, the reasonable necessity approach would help 
improve similar accounting at the domestic level, with respect to presidential justification of 
force to the public and Congress. For a historical analysis of domestic authorizations of force 
based on mistaken assessments or factual uncertainty, see Lori Fisler Damrosch, War and 
Uncertainty, 114 Yale L.J. 1405 (2005). 
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For all their limitations, multilateral inspections regimes should re-
main an integral part of an overall system for managing and reducing 
capability uncertainty. These processes, supplemented by national intel-
ligence, are a key mechanism for acquiring at least one important form 
of evidence: forensic.254 As such, an objective reasonableness system 
might benefit from not only preservation, but expansion of inspection 
systems and capabilities, such as the creation of a permanent U.N. in-
spectorate similar to UNMOVIC.255 Instead of obviating these auxiliary 
processes, a reasonable necessity approach should supplement them with 
a broader array of evidentiary tools; its objection to the traditional view 
is simply directed at over-reliance on exclusive decision-making proce-
dures and a corresponding likely narrow class of evidence. In turn, these 
additional tools can serve to reinforce a process regime by partially fore-
closing responses that exploit limitations of inspections. For example, as 
suggested above and explored in the next Part, legal burden-shifting and 
allocation of risks of factual judgment error through evidentiary norms can 
reduce the benefits of many forms of process manipulation.256 As a related 
point, a credible possibility of future military action (authorized through 
objective reasonableness architecture) could encourage disclosure, 
decrease the attractiveness of delay strategies, and eliminate the incentive 
to cultivate uncertainty for strategic purposes.257  
In a similar fashion, regulating force through objective standards 
should not be seen as incompatible with the U.N. Security Council sys-
tem, and could be complementary. Under almost any objective 
reasonableness regime, the U.N. Security Council is likely to remain the 
most desirable source of authorization and the uses of force it sanctions 
will remain per se or presumptively reasonable. Operating in parallel, 
there would be significant potential for reciprocal reinforcement. As 
Michael Doyle argues, 
[t]he mere fact that unilateral action could be considered legiti-
mate should have a responsibility-inducing effect on the Security 
Council. Rather than enjoying a monopoly, the council will now 
know that its actions are subject to the “market” of alternative 
judgment.258 
Exposing the U.N. Security Council to this sort of “healthy competi-
tion” would help push its members to deploy their votes and vetoes on the 
basis of the persuasiveness of their reasoning, instead of their institutional 
                                                                                                                      
 254. See infra, Part III.B.1. 
 255. See generally Findlay, supra note 156; Matthews, supra note 154. 
 256. See supra Part II.B.1; infra Part III.B.3. 
 257. See id. 
 258. Doyle, supra note 20, at 62. 
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prerogative.259 This is also the most promising mechanism for inducing 
the real, deliberative use of transparent guidelines in the U.N. Security 
Council. If faced with a competing assessment that is particular and or-
ganized by reference to objective criteria, the Council as a whole, and in 
terms of its individual members, would be pressured to clarify the basis 
for its decisions and explain why it reached a different conclusion. This 
process of bringing the capability judgments of U.N. Security Council 
decisions to the surface and forcing a substantive debate about eviden-
tiary standards is an important first step toward improving the way use of 
force rules operate under capability uncertainty.260  
While there are opportunities for symbiosis, the objective standards 
versus process approaches to managing factual uncertainty remain ana-
lytically and functionally distinct, and combining them carries some 
risks. The reasonable necessity view and the traditional view both em-
brace formal legal procedures but use them for different ends. In 
conducting evidentiary assessments pursuant to a reasonable necessity 
analysis, for example, there are hazards to employing legal processes 
originally designed for other purposes, including over-stressing them or 
disincentivizing their use by raising the stakes of their outcomes.  
International legal processes generally are designed to function 
within a broader regulatory system. IAEA inspection processes serve 
purposes within the larger nonproliferation regime, such as informing 
the actions of the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly.261 A 
state’s willingness to accept, endorse, or participate in these processes is 
likely to be at least partially dependent upon that state’s acceptance or 
approval of the process’ functional role—that is, in its acquiescence to 
legal consequences that might flow from compliance or noncompliance 
with international obligations.262 Put bluntly, if we sign up for this 
agreement, what are we getting ourselves into down the road? Attaching 
additional weight to these processes by tying them to an exogenous sys-
tem of force regulation can alter this calculus, making actors more 
reluctant to subscribe to a process with such far-reaching potential con-
                                                                                                                      
 259. See Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 127, at 20 (“[T]he democratic coalition pro-
vides an incentive for the permanent members to use the veto more responsibly and for all 
members of the Council to realize that they no longer enjoy an absolute monopoly on the 
legitimate authorization of preventive use of force.”). 
 260. The U.N. High-Level Panel recommends a set of substantive criteria to guide U.N. 
Security Council decisionmaking, but does not explain how these criteria will be enforced in 
practice. On ways to improve the deliberative quality of the U.N. Security Council, see, for 
example, Johnstone, supra note 171, at 303–07.  
 261. See supra notes 151, 156 and accompanying text; IAEA, The Texts of the Agency’s 
Agreements with the United Nations (Oct. 30, 1959), available at http://www.iaea.org/ 
Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc11.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2009). 
 262. See Blix, supra note 184, at 9–10 (discussing difficulties in overcoming states’ 
reluctance to commit legally to weapons inspection regimes). 
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sequences. For example, if the results of the inspections process (or even 
perceived interference with inspections) may be used to legally authorize 
military action, adopting objective necessity standards that draw on those 
findings or judgments may discourage strong demands for inspection by 
U.N. Security Council members or the consent of possible proliferators 
to inspections in the first place—undermining elements crucial to the 
success of the inspection regime.263 
Similarly, international legal processes all carry some risk of error, 
but the costs of these errors are to some extent circumscribed by the 
process’ functional role in a larger system. Linking the outcomes of a 
process to objective factors and evidentiary questions in a reasonable 
necessity system increases the potential cost of errors. Processes with 
deficiencies or error-probabilities that may have been undesirable but 
acceptable when the consequences of an erroneous output were limited 
by their narrow role in a larger framework may be unacceptable when 
the consequences include a factual conclusion that leads to the mistaken 
authorization (or non-authorization) of force against a state. As a result, 
processes that are useful in a limited role may be disfavored or aban-
doned by states or organizations for fear of the impact of their errors in 
an objective necessity analysis.  
These types of potential pitfalls are concerns that should shape the 
selection of evidentiary factors. Problems of calibrating a legal system’s 
evidentiary rules to manage risks of error and avoid perverse incentives 
are not new and should not deter us. Rather, they reveal the need to ana-
lyze more deeply how evidentiary principles could and should operate in 
the international legal regime. 
III. Next Steps: Developing Evidentiary Norms 
The analysis above points to the need for reasonable necessity pro-
ponents to address epistemic or evidentiary questions. In a world in 
which complete clarity or consensus regarding states’ WMD capabilities 
is impossible, how should states or collective security institutions judge 
capabilities? Furthermore, the preceding analysis suggests that even tra-
ditional view adherents, unpersuaded by the promise of objective 
standards, ought to consider more rigorously and systematically these 
evidentiary questions. The objective reasonableness analysis reveals that 
evidentiary principles reflect policy choices on such matters as how to 
balance competing risks (especially between false positives and false 
negatives), how to decide when sovereign equality should yield to extra 
                                                                                                                      
 263. This issue is explored in more detail infra Part III.C. 
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suspicion of particular states, and how to best combat WMD prolifera-
tion over the long term. Even if one remains unconvinced by the 
reasonable necessity approach, the evidentiary questions raised in this 
Part are critical to effective operation of legal processes advocated by the 
traditional, strict constructionists of the U.N. Charter. 
There exists a remarkable absence of well-established international 
law of evidence, even though the legality or illegality of uses of force 
often turns on disputed facts.264 By this I do not mean a set of formalized 
rules so much as principles developed through international legal and 
diplomatic discourse that can be articulated and applied across a range of 
cases. “Despite over one hundred years of international adjudication, and 
sixty years of Security Council fact-finding,” notes Mary Ellen 
O’Connell, “we cannot point to any well-established set of rules govern-
ing evidence in international law in general or in the case of self-defence 
in particular.”265 Jules Lobel similarly laments: 
Questions involving the standards and mechanisms for assessing 
complicated factual inquiries are generally not accorded the 
same treatment given by the legal academy to the more abstract 
issues involved in defining relevant international law standards. 
Unfortunately, international incidents generally involve disputed 
issues of fact, and in the absence of an international judicial or 
other centralized fact-finding mechanism, the ad hoc manner in 
which nations evaluate factual claims is often decisive.266 
This issue—what evidentiary principles should inform capability 
judgments—is critical to effective functioning of both an objective rea-
sonable necessity approach and a process-oriented traditional approach, 
to the extent that processes include collective assessments of WMD ca-
pabilities. Moreover, an examination of evidentiary logic points again 
toward symbioses between the objective reasonableness and process ap-
proaches to regulating force.  
A. How Much Uncertainty Is Reasonable? 
One approach to reasonable certainty would begin with a specific 
standard or burden of proof. In other words, rather than thinking about 
what level of confidence is sufficient on a case-by-case basis, law could 
set a generally applicable threshold that balances the relevant interests 
                                                                                                                      
 264. See Ruth Teitelbaum, Recent Fact-Finding Developments at the International Court 
of Justice, 6 Law & Prac. Int’l Courts & Tribunals 119 (2007) (discussing evidentiary 
issues in recent ICJ cases related to the use of force). 
 265. Mary Ellen O’Connell, Evidence of Terror, 7 J. Conflict & Sec. L. 19, 21 (2002). 
 266. Lobel, supra note 109, at 538. 
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across the set of cases. Some have suggested, for example, that anticipa-
tory uses of force ought to require “clear and convincing” evidence of a 
coming attack.267 Others would impose a higher requirement, tantamount 
to an American criminal justice standard of “beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”268 Along those lines, although not referring to the use of force, 
consider ElBaradei’s statement at the beginning of this paper, in which 
he invoked a criminal standard to explain why he could not issue af-
firmative conclusions about Iran’s nuclear weapons program.269  
The analysis above, however, cautions against simply applying a 
specific burden of proof from another area of law to WMD capability 
assessments. First, often these proposals of a specific proof standard fo-
cus predominantly on only one type of error risk: false positives 
(believing WMD to exist when none do). To the extent that domestic law 
and burdens of proof are a useful analog, the proper comparison is not to 
criminal trials, which are premised on unacceptability of convicting the 
innocent—hence, the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, which toler-
ates many guilty going free.270 The better analogy is to some types of 
civil litigation in which the costs of both false positives and false nega-
tives are very high. As Justice Harlan explained in In re Winship, 
“[b]ecause the standard of proof affects the comparative frequency of 
these two types of erroneous outcomes [false positives and false nega-
tives], the choice of the standard to be applied in a particular kind of 
                                                                                                                      
 267. See Mary Ellen O’Connell, Lawful Self-Defense to Terrorism, 63 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 
889, 889–90, 893 (2002); Mary Ellen O’Connell, Re-Leashing the Dogs of War, 97 Am. J. 
Int’l L. 446, 452–53 (2003) (reviewing Christine Gray, International Law and the 
Use of Force (2000)). Ruth Teitelbaum argues that the ICJ applied something similar to a 
clear and convincing evidence standard in its Oil Platforms and Congo v. Uganda judgments 
related to self-defense. See Teitelbaum, supra note 264, at 125–26. 
 268. The “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard for criminal conviction, held to be con-
stitutionally required in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), reflects one possible balance of 
competing harms with respect to criminal suspects. As Blackstone explained, “it is better that 
ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.” 4 William Blackstone, Commen-
taries on the Laws of England 358. 
 269. See sources cited supra note 2. 
 270. Moreover, to the extent that the criminal analogy is appropriate, the proper analog is 
the criminal justification of self-defense standard, not the criminal conviction standard. In 
New York state, the standard for the lethal use of force in self-defense has a subjective compo-
nent in addition to an objective/reasonableness component. To satisfy this subjective 
component, a defendant must show that he “believed that deadly force was necessary to avert 
the imminent use of deadly force or the commission of certain felonies.” People v. Goetz, 497 
N.E.2d 41, 51 (N.Y. 1986). Fletcher and Ohlin write that the subjective component is imposed 
so that “the defendant cannot take advantage of circumstances beyond his knowledge and 
intention”—or, in other words, it is imposed to prevent the pretextual use of force. Fletcher 
& Ohlin, supra note 129, at 105. They argue that “[t]he same rule should apply in the interna-
tional context. . . . [In the case of Iraq, t]he claims about WMD must have been believed . . . . 
The relevant question, therefore, is not justification ex post . . . but justification ex ante . . . .” 
Id. 
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litigation should, in a rational world, reflect an assessment of the com-
parative social disutility of each.”271  
Consider, for example, litigation to terminate parental rights, in 
which a faulty factual assessment could result in needlessly breaking up 
a family (a false positive) or in exposing a child to abuse (a false nega-
tive).272 In setting a standard of proof for these cases, the Supreme Court 
noted the particular importance of calibrating a standard that appropri-
ately and effectively balanced false positives and false negatives, given 
the finality and irrevocability of the grave effects of this type of state 
action,273 and given the magnified risk of error in this type of proceed-
ing.274 To this end, the Court rejected a “preponderance of the evidence” 
standard, noting this standard’s focus on the quantity rather than the 
quality of the evidence275 and its typical application to a class of cases 
reflecting a lesser societal policy concern with the outcome (as in cases 
where, for instance, money damages between two private parties are at 
stake).276 However, the Court also rejected a “beyond a reasonable doubt” 
standard, maintaining that this standard is too high in cases where a 
court has to decide issues difficult to “prove to a level of absolute cer-
tainty,” with the practical effect of such a high standard being the 
imposition of an “unreasonable barrier to state efforts” to accomplish an 
important state goal.277 The Court consequently held that the most appro-
priate way to balance the risk of false positives and false negatives in 
termination of parental rights cases, with their high stakes and their 
fairly substantial potential for error, was with a “clear and convincing 
evidence” standard, which “strikes a fair balance between the rights of 
the natural parents and the State’s legitimate concerns” and “adequately 
conveys to the factfinder the level of subjective certainty about his fac-
tual conclusions necessary to satisfy due process.”278 
                                                                                                                      
 271. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 371 (Harlan, J., concurring).  
 272. See Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981). 
 273. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59 (1982). 
 274. Id. at 762–64. The Court noted four reasons for this magnified risk of error: The 
relevant substantive standards are “imprecise,” which “leave[s] determinations unusually open 
to the subjective values of the judge”; the court possesses “unusual discretion to underweigh 
probative facts that might favor the parent”; the state is usually a more capable adversary than 
the parents (for both institutional capacity and educational reasons); and parents have no dou-
ble jeopardy defense in termination proceedings—the state can collect more evidence and re-
initiate proceedings as many times as it wants. 
 275. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 764 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371, n.3 (1970) 
(Harlan, J., concurring)). 
 276. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 754–55 (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 
(1979)). 
 277. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 768–69. 
 278. Id. at 769.  
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The choice of any minimum standard of proof justifying the use of 
force ought to similarly be framed in terms of the risks of both too much 
self-defensive force and too little.279 It may well be that a high proof 
burden is nevertheless warranted; after all, the Iraq war shows all too 
well the potential costs of preemptive war based on mistake of fact. But 
the notion that we should look to domestic evidence law principles of a 
minimum evidentiary threshold does little to answer the critical 
questions of where to set that threshold, or whether to set it with a static 
versus an elastic standard. 
The second problem with setting a single, specific proof standard is 
that using a standard still requires the decisionmaker to analytically dis-
aggregate the elements of the threat, which include both capability to 
inflict harm (that is, the probability that a state has WMD) and intent to 
use it (that is, the probability of the state using that capability in an ag-
gressive or threatening way). There is something to be said for a “clear 
and convincing” requirement if one believes that such a standard is cali-
brated to balance false positives and false negatives, but the referent of 
that standard should be the WMD threat—a composite of capability and 
intent. This suggests that the required degree of certainty about capabil-
ity ought to vary with certainty about intent. The higher the likelihood 
that an adversary would choose to use a WMD capability if it has or gets 
it, the lower the necessary certainty of capability that should justify an 
anticipatory or preemptive strike.280  
Recognizing that both intent and capability are critical to an overall 
threat assessment, and acknowledging that precautionary action might be 
justified under conditions of higher doubt about capability as certainty of 
hostile intent increases, one might nevertheless propose a minimum 
threshold for both components. Christopher Greenwood, for example, 
argues for a certainty threshold of both intent and capability: “[T]he right 
of self-defense will justify action only where there is sufficient evidence 
that the threat of attack exists. That will require evidence not only of the 
possession of weapons but also of an intention to use them.”281 Such a 
principle is appealing, although it still returns to the difficult question of 
                                                                                                                      
 279. See Dale A. Nance, Evidential Completeness and the Burden of Proof, 49 Hastings 
L.J. 621, 622 (1998) (“The now conventional understanding of the burden of proof is that the 
level or weight of the burden of persuasion is determined by the expected utilities associated 
with correct and incorrect alternative decisions.”). 
 280. On the difficulty of assessing states’ intentions, see generally Robert Jervis, Per-
ception and Misperception in International Politics (1976); Acton, supra note 87, at 
124–26. 
 281. Greenwood, supra note 37, at 16. 
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where to set the appropriate minimum for each sub-part of the “suffi-
cient” threat.282 
The point of this discussion is not to reject the idea of attaching 
minimum evidentiary burdens. Rather, it is to illustrate that the more 
challenging issue is where to set the sufficiency line. That calibration 
depends on weighing the relative risks of false positives and false nega-
tives, and on assumptions about the future intent of states. One point that 
can be drawn from the analysis in Parts I and II of this paper is that evi-
dentiary thresholds that might have worked well in a world of 
conventional threats—where capabilities could be judged with high ac-
curacy and the costs of false negatives to peace and security were not 
necessarily devastating—risk exposing states to unacceptable dangers. 
Accordingly, they ought to be sufficiently flexible to account for the in-
evitable factual uncertainty and high security stakes of WMD 
capabilities, as well as the specific hostile policies or ambitions of the 
state in question. 
And returning to the central issue of this paper, this still leaves the 
question of what sorts of evidence or judgments should be relevant to 
and should comprise the ultimate capability assessment: how likely is it 
that a state has or will soon have a WMD capability?  
B. What Type of Evidence Is Reasonable? 
Besides the standard of proof, a second epistemic issue raised by the 
objective reasonableness approach is what types of evidence ought to be 
reasonably relied upon. The analysis above shows that the most obvious 
and preferred type of evidence—forensic evidence of WMD capabilities 
or programs—will often be insufficient on its own to meet a reasonable-
ness standard, but that drawing on process approaches to assessing 
capabilities helps to strengthen the utility of such evidence. This Section 
also explores what other types of evidentiary logic might supplement 
forensic information. 
1. Forensic Evidence 
The United States and Britain, in presenting the public case against 
Iraq, cited numerous sets of forensic evidence to bolster their assertions 
that Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons, and that it was 
reconstituting its nuclear weapons capability. The forensic evidence in-
cluded data from international inspections showing missing or 
                                                                                                                      
 282. Greenwood’s use of the term “evidence” is significant for raising another idea 
sometimes proposed for making objectively reasonable capability assessments: a transparency 
requirement. See infra notes 296–300 and accompanying text. 
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unaccounted-for weapons;283 satellite imagery of ballistic missile compo-
nents and WMD-related facilities;284 evidence that facilities previously 
used for WMD production had been rebuilt;285 and Iraq’s purchase of 
equipment that could be used for WMD development.286 Several pieces 
of forensic evidence cited by the United States and Britain have since 
gained notoriety for their inaccuracy.287 For example, the United States 
relied on discredited evidence that Iraq had deployed mobile biological 
agent facilities288 and documents—later found to be forged—indicating 
that Iraq had purchased uranium products from Niger.289  
Claims about forensic evidence have also featured prominently in 
U.S. and British public cases about Iran’s nuclear weapon ambitions. 
Specifically, government officials have pointed to international inspec-
tors’ discovery of a fifteen-page document describing the casting and 
machining of enriched uranium hemispheres, which have no known use 
except in nuclear weapons;290 a laptop from Iran obtained by U.S. 
                                                                                                                      
 283. See Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruc-
tion: The Assessment of the British Government 16 (2002), available at http://www. 
fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/pdf3/fco_iraqdossier (last visited Oct. 6, 2009) [hereinafter Brit-
ish Assessment of Iraq’s WMD]; see also U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4701st mtg., U.N Doc. 
S/PV.4701 (Jan. 1, 2003) [hereinafter Powell Remarks].  
 284. See President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President on Iraq (Oct. 7, 2002), 
available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021007-
8.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2009); see also Powell Remarks, supra note 283.  
 285. See Bush, supra note 284 (“Satellite photographs reveal that Iraq is rebuilding fa-
cilities at sites that have been part of its nuclear program in the past.”); see also British 
Assessment of Iraq’s WMD, supra note 283, at 20.  
 286. See British Assessment of Iraq’s WMD, supra note 283, at 22 (“Some dual-use 
equipment has also been purchased, but without monitoring by UN inspectors Iraq could have 
diverted it to their biological weapons programme.”); see also Powell Remarks, supra note 
283. 
 287. See Sarah Lyall, Britain Admits that Much of Its Report on Iraq Came from Maga-
zines, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 2003, at A9; see also Walter H. Pincus, Report Details Errors Before 
War, Wash. Post, Sept. 9, 2006, at A26.  
 288. Select Comm. on Intelligence, U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar 
Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, S. Rep. No. 108-31, at 150 (2004) (stating the assertion 
was based on a source known as “Curveball” and was not bolstered by satellite imagery). 
 289. See S. Rep. No. 108-31, at 77–82 (2004). 
 290. See United States Policy Toward Iran Next Steps: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on 
Int’l Relations, 109th Cong. 26 (2006) (statement of the Hon. Robert G. Joseph, Under Sec’y 
for Arms Control & Int’l Sec., U.S. Dept. of State), available at http://web.archive.org/web/ 
20060616215047/http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/63121.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2009) [hereinaf-
ter Joseph Testimony]; Subcomm. on Intelligence Policy, H. Permanent Select Comm. 
on Intelligence, Recognizing Iran as a Strategic Threat: An Intelligence Chal-
lenge for the United States (2006), available at http://intelligence.house.gov/ 
media/pdfs/iranreport082206v2.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2009); Interview by Channel 4 News 
with Jack Straw, Foreign Sec’y, U.K. Foreign & Commonwealth Office (Jan. 16, 2006), avail-
able at http://www.iranwatch.org/government/UK/uk-fco-strawinterview-011606.htm (last 
visited Oct. 6, 2009); Interview by BBC 1 with Jack Straw, Foreign Sec’y, U.K. Foreign & 
Commonwealth Office (Apr. 9, 2006), available at http://www.iranwatch.org/government/ 
UK/uk-fco-straw-interview-bbc-040906.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2009); see also IAEA, 
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intelligence containing thousands of drawings including a schematic for 
a nuclear bomb test site, designs for a small-scale facility for uranium 
conversion, and drawings of modifications to Iran’s ballistic missiles in 
ways that might accommodate a nuclear warhead;291 design drawings 
showing a heavy-water reactor at Arak with enough capacity to produce 
plutonium for nuclear weapons;292 and traces of weapons-grade uranium 
on centrifuges in Iran.293  
To the extent it is available, one advantage of forensic evidence is 
that as a type of evidence, it is universally recognized as legitimate, es-
pecially if it withstands public scrutiny. This is one reason why the 
United States went before the U.N. Security Council with its photo-
graphs during the Cuban missile crisis, even though it had no chance of 
obtaining Council backing for any action due to certain Soviet veto.294 
More recently, following a reported 2007 Israeli strike against an alleged 
nuclear weapons-related facility in Syria, the U.S. Government publicly 
released images and video footage to substantiate the claim that the tar-
gets were nuclear weapons-related facilities.295 
A number of scholars argue that any evidence used to support pre-
cautionary self-defense claims should be made public and subjected to 
international scrutiny.296 Some who urge this evidentiary publicity re-
                                                                                                                      
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Report by 
the Director General, at 2, IAEA Doc. GOV/2005/87 (Nov. 18, 2005) (describing the contents 
of the fifteen-page document). 
 291. See William J. Broad & David E. Sanger, Relying on Computer, U.S. Seeks 
to Prove Iran’s Nuclear Aims, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 2005, available at http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2005/11/13/international/middleeast/13nukes.html (last visited Oct. 6, 
2009); Dafna Linzer, Strong Leads and Dead Ends in Nuclear Case Against Iran, Wash. 
Post, Feb. 8, 2006, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
article/2006/02/07/ AR2006020702126.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2009).  
 292. See Iranian Proliferation: Implications for Terrorists, Their State Sponsors, and 
U.S. Counter-Proliferation Policy: Hearing Before the H. Int’l Relations Comm. Subcomm. on 
the Middle East and Central Asia, 108th Cong. 108-44 (2004) (statement of John R. Bolton, 
Under Sec’y for Arms Control and Int’l Security), available at http://www. 
foreignaffairs.house.gov/archives/108/94511.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2009) [hereinafter Bolton 
Testimony]; Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte, U.S. Permanent Rep. to the U.N., Vienna and 
the IAEA, Remarks to the German United National Association, Bavarian Chapter (Feb. 7, 
2007), available at http://web.archive.org/web/20071223161539/http://www.state.gov/p/io/ 
rls/rm/80203.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2009). 
 293. See David Gauke, Excerpts of Debate on Iran’s Nuclear Programme, U.K. H. of 
Commons (Feb. 1, 2006), available at http://www.iranwatch.org/government/UK/uk-
commons-iran-nuclearprogramme-020106.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2009).  
 294. See Chayes, supra note 248, at 84–85 (stating that the display of photographs at the 
United Nations “was as effective in generating support for and neutralizing opposition to the 
United States as any other action in the week of the crisis”).  
 295. See David E. Sanger, Bush Administration Releases Images to Bolster Its Claims 
About Syrian Reactor, N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 2008, at A6. 
 296. See Fletcher & Ohlin, supra note 129 at 169; Jonathan I. Charney, The Use of 
Force Against Terrorism and International Law, 95 Am. J. Int’l. L. 835, 836 (2001); Lobel, 
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quirement believe that greater public scrutiny of evidence generally im-
proves its quality through debate and refutation, while others emphasize 
the legitimacy benefits.297 As George Fletcher and Jens Ohlin argue,  
[t]he principle of publicity is critical in a self-administering sys-
tem of law. There is no court to determine the facts underlying 
international legal conflicts; there is no authority but the eyes of 
the world to assess whether the United States had sufficient evi-
dence to warrant its claim of dangerous and deployable WMD in 
Iraq.298  
An assumption underlying these arguments is usually that much of the 
evidentiary case about capability will be forensic evidence—that is, that 
there will be something to be “shown” publicly.  
Those who argue for public scrutiny are undoubtedly correct that 
whenever possible the information relied upon to support precautionary 
self-defense claims should be aired publicly, preferably before the use of 
force. But there are several limitations of a public disclosure requirement 
for regulating force. One practical problem frequently raised in response 
is that key information often cannot be disclosed publicly without com-
promising critical intelligence sources and methods.299  
A second, more important limitation, to repeat the point from earlier, 
is that forensic evidence alone will rarely be conclusive.300 Future con-
frontations with rogue states that might have WMD are unlikely to 
feature Adlai Stevenson-type moments, with overwhelming and publicly 
available forensic evidence to support claims about threatening capabili-
ties. Significant parts of a public case will likely need to be inferential, 
relying on reasoned deduction. This raises the question: what types of 
inferences are appropriate? 
                                                                                                                      
supra note 109, at 547; see also Wilmshurst, supra note 44, at 9 (“The determination of 
‘imminence’. . . must be made in good faith and on grounds which are capable of objective 
assessment. Insofar as this can reasonably be achieved, the evidence should be publicly de-
monstrable.”). 
 297. Fletcher & Ohlin, supra note 129, at 161, 169; see also Lobel, supra note 109, at 
547, 552–55 (arguing that public disclosure of evidence on which self-defense rests is required 
under the U.N. Charter regime). 
 298. Fletcher & Ohlin, supra note 129, at 169. 
 299. See Schmitt, supra note 46, at 113–14 (“A more reasonable standard would require 
disclosure to the extent practicable in the circumstances.”); Wedgwood, supra note 166; see 
also Joyner, supra note 75, at 292 (“The intelligence which states collect on WMD threats of 
a nature which causes them such serious concern as to warrant a decision to use pre-emptive 
military force, is intelligence of the highest sensitivity, and will have been collected through 
means the secrecy of which the collecting state will protect at all costs. Information of this 
sensitivity will simply not be shared by states with a group as diverse as the Security Council, 
no matter who the collecting state is.”). 
 300. See supra Part I.C. 
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2. Propensity Inferences 
One type of inference—another common element of WMD capabil-
ity assessments besides forensic evidence—is what might be termed 
“propensity” evidence, or evidence about past conduct or a regime’s de-
cisionmaking or strategic calculus that shows likelihood that the regime 
is inclined towards acquiring WMD. Especially given that assessing 
WMD capabilities accurately is difficult because many components of 
such programs could have non-military purposes, understanding the 
likely motivations of states may be critical to making sense of forensic 
data points. 
In the case of Iraq, for example, the WMD Commission Report 
noted that “any assessment of the effect of Saddam’s political situation 
on his decisions about WMD in the years from 1991 to 2003 would more 
likely than not have resulted—and, in point of fact, did result—in the 
conclusion that Saddam retained his WMD programs.”301 Looking to 
Iraq’s recent past behavior, the likely strategic rationale behind that be-
havior, and the Iraqi political situation, the intelligence community 
assessed that Saddam was determined to retain WMD to intimidate his 
neighbors and deter potential adversaries such as Iran, Israel, and the 
United States.302 More recently, the U.S. government has made similar 
arguments in support of its claims about Iran’s suspected nuclear weap-
ons program, including that Iran has a history of violating arms control 
treaties,303 that it publicly spurns relevant international legal commit-
ments,304 and that its pattern of behavior is consistent with nuclear 
weapon ambitions.305  
                                                                                                                      
 301. WMD Commission Report, supra note 67, at 147. 
 302. Id. at 147–51. 
 303. See Joseph Testimony, supra note 290 (“For almost 20 years, Iran systematically 
violated its IAEA safeguards and NPT obligations.”). 
 304. See Bolton Testimony, supra note 292, at 21 (“Iranian President Mohamed Khatami 
declared that Iran was no longer bound by any ‘moral commitment’ to continue suspending 
uranium enrichment . . . .”); Sec’y of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Interview with Harry 
Smith of Face the Nation, Sept. 25, 2009, available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/ 
2009a/09/129674.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2009) (“I think it’s really essential that we satisfy 
ourselves and the international community, which has passed numerous resolutions against 
Iran’s program, pointing out that they are violating UN and IAEA obligations and the Non-
Proliferation Treaty . . . .”). 
 305. See Clinton, supra note 304 (“This latest incident concerning the facility at Qum, it 
would have been disclosed were it for peaceful purposes.”); Sec’y of Defense Robert Gates 
Interview on CNN’s State of the Union with John King, Sept. 27, 2009, available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4487 (last visited Oct. 19, 
2009) (“[T]he intelligence people have no doubt that this is an illicit nuclear facility, if only 
because the Iranians kept it a secret. If they wanted it for peaceful nuclear purposes, there’s no 
reason to put it so deep underground, no reason to be deceptive about it, keep it a secret for a 
protracted period of time.”); Joseph Testimony, supra note 290 (“The secret origins, military 
involvement, acquisition of key technologies from a proliferation network, violation of IAEA 
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A critical question for any legal mode of capability assessment, but 
especially for the reasonable necessity approach, is when and how heav-
ily to credit propensity inferences. 
Take the suggestion made by both the U.S. and British governments 
that Saddam Hussein’s prior use of chemical weapons against his own 
citizens revealed a likelihood that he still had, or was bent on re-
acquiring, WMD. In its public case about Iraq’s WMD capability before 
the 2003 invasion, the British government highlighted Iraq’s breaches of 
various international arms control conventions306 and emphasized that 
“Saddam has pursued a long-term programme of persecution of the Iraqi 
Kurds, including through the use of chemical weapons.”307 In his U.N. 
Security Council presentation, Secretary of State Powell reminded that 
“Saddam Hussein has used these horrific weapons—on another country 
and on his own people. In fact, in the history of chemical warfare no 
country has had more battlefield experience with chemical weapons 
since the First World War than Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.”308  
What is the evidentiary logic behind such statements? Skeptics may 
be tempted to dismiss these statements about past conduct as designed to 
obfuscate a lack of evidence about present capabilities. And certainly 
they are highly relevant to the issue of future intent to use WMD. View-
ing them in evidentiary terms about capability, however, there are 
various ways in which propensity inferences could factor into assess-
ments. Consider the following syllogisms that might support claims that 
Iraq had rebuilt or was rebuilding WMD: 
• A state that formerly had and used WMD is likely to have 
them today (or seek them tomorrow) because its former use 
reveals its strong belief in their strategic utility.  
• A state that was willing to use WMD against its own popula-
tion in the past is the type of regime or has the type of 
leadership ideology that is likely to have or seek WMD.  
• A state that commits mass atrocities against its own popula-
tion deserves no benefit of the doubt, and instead should be 
presumed to have or seek WMD unless it assures otherwise.  
                                                                                                                      
safeguards, false reporting to the IAEA, and denial of IAEA requests for access to individuals 
and locations also belie assertions of peaceful intent.”). 
 306. See British Assessment of Iraq’s WMD, supra note 283, at 33–34. 
 307. Id. at 44; see also Dir. of Cent. Intelligence, Iraq’s Weapons of Mass De-
struction Program 4 (2002) (detailing Iraq’s history of breaching U.N. Security Council 
Resolutions related to WMD dating back to 1991). 
 308. Powell Remarks, supra note 283, at 10. 
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• A state that previously committed mass atrocities with WMD 
is unlikely to be checked from pursuing WMD by interna-
tional law and processes.  
In considering the reasonableness of relying on any such propensity 
logic, one natural question to ask is how accurate the logic is likely to 
be. After all, it turned out to be dangerously misleading in the Iraq case: 
“Given Iraq’s history with WMD, its desire for regional dominance, and 
the weaknesses in its conventional military forces, the [Intelligence] 
Community did not consider the possibility that Saddam would try to 
achieve such intimidation and deterrence while bluffing about his pos-
session of WMD.”309 Political scientists have spent decades studying this 
issue but there exists no consensus based on empirical data.310 It might 
even be that those contemplating self-defensive force against a notorious 
human rights-abusing state are especially susceptible to biased assess-
ments based on culturally skewed views of state decisionmaking.311  
It would obviously be helpful to have available reliable, direct meas-
ures of motive or intent—clear indicators of a state’s state of mind—but 
those tend to be hard to come by in international affairs,312 and most pro-
liferating states proclaim publicly and privately their non-military 
intentions. That said, as noted above there is no escaping some reliance 
on propensity inferences because of the limits of forensic evidence and 
the likelihood that many WMD-production or arsenal features appear 
almost indistinguishable from non-military programs without some un-
derstanding of their likely purpose.313 
Besides accuracy, a second question to ask is whether it is legitimate 
to draw propensity inferences in these situations. Seen not through the 
eyes of the United States but through those of weaker states—or 
especially those who ultimately might be the target of precautionary 
force—the idea that past behavior or strategic and political 
                                                                                                                      
 309. WMD Commission Report, supra note 67, at 151. 
 310. See William C. Potter & Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, Divining Nuclear Intentions: A 
Review Essay, 33 Int’l Security, Summer 2008, at 139; Scott D. Sagan, Why Do States 
Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb, 21 Int’l Security, Winter 
1996–97, at 54. 
 311. Cf. Richard S. Bell, Decision Theory and Due Process: A Critique of the Supreme 
Court’s Lawmaking for Burdens of Proof, 78 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 557, 581–82 (1987) 
(explaining how American evidentiary rules are sometimes structured to compensate for wide-
spread inferential biases). On the role of cognitive biases in shaping threat perception, see 
Robert Jervis, Perceiving and Coping with Threat, in Psychology and Deterrence 13 
(1985).  
 312. Indeed, one problem with discerning intentions is that they may not exist (a gov-
ernment may be undecided) or may change. See generally Jervis, supra note 280. 
 313. See Elbridge A. Colby, Making Intelligence Smart, Pol’y Rev., Aug.–Sept. 2007, at 
71, 78 (“It is precisely in the nexus between capabilities and intentions that the toughest intel-
ligence challenges are to be found.”). 
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circumstances could give rise to presumptions of WMD development 
will be viewed unsympathetically. The U.N. Charter system is built, after 
all, upon sovereign equality.314 In the eyes of weaker states, the United 
States and other nuclear powers also have not lived up to their end of the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty bargain, to provide civilian nuclear technology 
to those who want it and to work toward their own military 
denuclearization.315 Yet these inferential judgments will inescapably 
affect assessments of threats, if not as evidence of WMD capability 
designs, then as evidence of hostile intentions or as reason to reduce the 
overall standard of proof required for defensive measures.316 
One way to address these objections is to frame propensity argu-
ments in terms of violations of U.N. Charter norms and Security Council 
dictates, as well as other solid international legal norms. That is, it may 
be viewed as more legitimate to draw inferences based on behavior that a 
state has no right to engage in in the first place—such as activities pro-
hibited by international agreements. It may seem hypocritical, even 
cynical, to traditional view proponents to draw negative inferences 
against states for violating international rules as part of an effort con-
templating use of force outside the U.N. Security Council system. But it 
has the advantage of channeling evidentiary logic—and ultimately 
precedent—in terms of a common, universally respected set of expecta-
tions.317  
                                                                                                                      
 314. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para 1 (“The Organization is based on the principle of the 
sovereign equality of all its Members.”); see also Lee, supra note 110, at 148 (“Sovereign 
equality is the concept that every sovereign state possesses the same legal rights as any other 
sovereign state at international law.”). 
 315. See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons art. IV, para. 2, opened for 
signature July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 (“All the Parties to the Treaty under-
take to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of 
equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy.”); id. art. VI (“Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotia-
tions in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an 
early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament 
under strict and effective international control.”); see also Andrew Flibbert, After Saddam: 
Regional Insecurity, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Proliferation Pressures in Postwar 
Iraq, 118 Pol. Sci. Q. 547, 557–58 (“[A]s a matter of political reality, probably all sovereign 
states question the U.S. arrogation to itself of the right to limit their possession of WMD while 
continuing to expand American capability and knowledge in this domain.”). 
 316. For an early expression of this idea, see Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Na-
tions 337 bk. 3, § 44 (S & E Butler 1805) (“When once a state has given proofs of injustice, 
rapacity, pride, ambition, or an imperious thirst of rule, she becomes an object of suspicion to 
her neighbours, whose duty it is to stand on their guard against her.”). 
 317. See Johnstone, supra note 167, at 440–51. 
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C. Burden-Shifting and Risk Allocation 
Another reason why forensic evidence alone is likely to be insuffi-
cient to establish WMD capability assessments with high certainty is 
because states seeking WMD may refuse to allow international inspec-
tors or may fail to provide them with full accounting of their dual-use 
activities. To what extent should such refusal contribute to a conclusion 
that the state is hiding weapons or programs? Put another way, under 
what circumstances should the risk of erroneous assessment be shifted 
onto the alleged proliferators?318  
A major part of the U.S. and British case against Iraq turned on in-
ferences about its refusal to allow U.N. inspectors full and unrestricted 
access to alleged WMD facilities. President Bush explained in his Octo-
ber 2002 remarks to the nation that “[t]he U.N. inspections program was 
met with systematic deception. The Iraqi regime bugged hotel rooms and 
offices of inspectors . . . they forged documents, destroyed evidence, and 
developed mobile weapons facilities to keep a step ahead of inspec-
tors.”319 The CIA in its public dossier similarly emphasized Iraq’s pattern 
of deception and withholding of information as evidence of WMD de-
velopment.320 The United Kingdom, too, underscored “that Saddam has 
learnt lessons from previous weapons inspections, has identified possible 
weak points in the inspections process and knows how to exploit 
them.”321 The implication of these statements was either that Iraq’s past 
behavior showed a likelihood that it was building WMD, or that the bur-
den of proof as to its WMD capability ought to have been lowered on 
account of its prior behavior.  
But, again, in the Iraq case this logic proved misguiding: the refusal 
to submit to thorough inspection did not reflect Iraq’s possession of 
WMD programs but may have even been designed to avoid revealing to 
domestic and regional rivals that it did not have such programs. What is 
somewhat ironic in the case of Iraq (and likely other cases) is that Sad-
dam probably wanted some observers—especially regional rivals—to 
draw a negative inference about his WMD efforts: 
                                                                                                                      
 318. Again, Vattel considered this problem, and suggested that “[neighbor states] may 
come upon [a state] at the moment when she is on the point of acquiring a formidable acces-
sion of power,—may demand securities,—and, if she hesitates to give them, may prevent her 
designs by force of arms.” Vattel, supra note 316, at bk. 3, § 44. 
 319. President’s Address to the Nation on Iraq from Cincinnati, Ohio, 34 Wkly Comp. 
Pres. Doc. 1716 (Oct. 7, 2002). 
 320. Dir. of Cent. Intelligence, supra note 307, at 5. (“In the absence of inspectors, 
Baghdad’s already considerable ability to work on prohibited programs without risk of dis-
covery has increased, and there is substantial evidence that Iraq is reconstituting prohibited 
programs.”).  
 321. British Assessment of Iraq’s WMD, supra note 283, at 19.  
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[I]n an attempt to project power—both domestically as well as 
against perceived regional threats such as Iran and Israel—Iraq 
chose to obfuscate whether it actually possessed WMD. As a re-
sult, the U.S. Intelligence Community—and many other 
intelligence services around the world—believed that Iraq con-
tinued to possess unconventional weapons in large part because 
Iraqis were acting as if they did have them.322 
Indeed, “even when there was nothing incriminating to hide, the 
Iraqis did not fully cooperate with the inspectors, judging that an effec-
tive United Nations inspection process would expose Iraq’s lack of 
WMD and therefore expose its vulnerability . . . .”323 Many believe that 
Iran may currently be exaggerating its uranium enrichment capabilities 
in order to create a perception that its nuclear development progress is 
irreversible.324 
When and how should negative inferences drawn from deliberate 
failure to disclose information form part of a reasonable assessment? Or, 
as a corollary, who ought to bear the risk of mistaken assessments based 
in part on a party’s refusal to provide accurate information? 
In effect, drawing a negative inference (that is, that there is a greater 
probability that a state has WMD) from its intransigence in revealing 
information shifts some burden of persuasion onto the suspect state: 
absent evidence showing that it does not have WMD, its impairment of 
inspections justifies an inference that it does. Looking by analogy to 
evidence law in the domestic context, such burden-shifting occurs all the 
time. It is common throughout the law to place proof burdens on the 
party with best access to information, or who can provide it at the least 
cost.325 The evidential damage doctrine, for example, shifts the burden of 
persuasion to the defendant in certain circumstances when he wrongfully 
contributes to uncertainty about key facts, and “missing witness” 
instructions sometimes allow adverse inferences against parties that 
refuse to make available witnesses who could resolve factual disputes.326  
                                                                                                                      
 322. WMD Commission Report, supra note 67, at 148; see also Cent. Intelligence 
Agency, Regime Strategic Intent, in 1 Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to 
the DCI on Iraqi WMD 34 (2004). 
 323. WMD Commission Report, supra note 67, at 153 (emphasis added). 
 324. See David E. Sanger & William J. Broad, Allies’ Clocks Tick Differently on Iran, 
N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 2009, at WK1. 
 325. See generally Bruce L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, Burdens of Proof in Civil Litiga-
tion: An Economic Perspective, 26 J. Legal Stud. 413 (1997) (using economic models to 
show that properly assigned burdens of proof economize the transmission of information to 
the court). 
 326. See Alex Stein, Foundations of Evidence Law 167–70, 240–41 (2005).  
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There is also some precedent for such an approach in ICJ jurispru-
dence.327 In the first major ICJ case applying the U.N. Charter use of 
force rules, the Corfu Channel case, the court confronted an issue of ad-
judicating disputed facts, over whether Albania knew or should have 
known of mines illegally deployed in its territorial waters.328 Although 
the court did not find that Albania’s position as the party best situated to 
prove or disprove the allegation was alone sufficient to shift onto it the 
burden of disproof,329 the court did note that such burden-shifting might 
be appropriate in cases where such a party inhibits discovery.330 More-
over, it went on to explain that:  
[T]he fact of this exclusive territorial control exercised by a 
State within its frontiers has a bearing upon the methods of 
proof available to establish the knowledge of that State as to 
such events. By reason of this exclusive control, the other State, 
the victim of a breach of international law, is often unable to 
furnish direct proof of facts giving rise to responsibility. Such a 
State should be allowed a more liberal recourse to inferences of 
fact and circumstantial evidence. This indirect evidence is admit-
ted in all systems of law, and its use is recognized by 
international decisions.331 
Perhaps similarly a state that refuses to disclose or permit inspectors 
ought bear a greater share of the risk of erroneous military intervention, 
since its refusal to provide information likely contributed to that error.  
Probably in part due to the Iraq experience, IAEA Director 
Mohamed ElBaradei avoided publicly drawing a negative inference from 
Iran’s refusal to come forward with required information: “if we do not 
obtain the necessary information and if we do not get immediate and full 
co-operation by Iran, we will not be able to verify the Iranian pro-
gramme. And that is in itself a conclusion—that we are unable to verify. 
But it is not a positive conclusion because it casts doubt on the whole 
system.”332 Rather than insinuating a negative inference from Iran’s in-
transigence, on another occasion ElBaradei has said that “unless Iran is 
able to provide answers to the Agency about our concerns, then we will 
                                                                                                                      
 327. See Teitelbaum, supra note 264, at 129–39. 
 328. See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Albania), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9). 
 329. See id. at 18. 
 330. See id. 
 331. Id. 
 332. Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Dir.-Gen., IAEA, Director General’s Remarks to the 
IAEA Board of Governors During Its Meeting (Sept. 9, 2003), available at http:// 
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continue to be in a position where we have to reserve judgment about 
their programme.”333 
While the Iraq errors demonstrate a need for caution in drawing ad-
verse factual inferences based on a state’s refusal to disclose 
information, such a principle might still promote accuracy in the long 
term if states then come to understand that their intransigence may shift 
the burden of persuasion against them. Put another way, a burden-
shifting rule like this has the effect of allocating risk of error to the sub-
ject state, which has greater incentive to comply with information 
requests. In essence, a state that refuses to disclose or permit inspectors 
ought to bear a greater share of the risk of erroneous military interven-
tion, since its refusal to provide information likely contributed to that 
error. Especially if one believes that deliberately feigning a WMD capa-
bility is destabilizing, shifting the burden of persuasion or shifting the 
allocation of error risk may create stabilizing counter-incentives.334 
With regard to the legitimacy of such burden or risk-shifting, one 
might object that states generally ought not to be required to open their 
military and industrial secrets to the world, especially at gunpoint. In-
deed, opening oneself to mandatory international inspections or military 
information requests cuts deeply into the core of sovereignty, but gener-
ally such infringements are legitimate if based on international legal 
obligation, especially consensual treaty-based regimes.335 Here law has a 
powerful role to play, and again the process orientation of the traditional 
view can help bolster the evidentiary logic so necessary to the function-
ing of objective reasonableness analysis.  
Consider U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441, which contained 
the following provision: “[F]alse statements or omissions in the decla-
rations submitted by Iraq pursuant to this resolution and failure by Iraq 
at any time to comply with, and cooperate fully in the implementation 
of, this resolution shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq’s 
obligations . . . . ”336 Most legal analysis of this provision has focused 
on the so-called “automaticity” debate: that is, whether by declaring a 
failure to disclose accurate information to be a material breach, Reso-
lution 1441—by reference to earlier Iraq resolutions authorizing the 
use of force to enforce Iraq’s obligations stemming from the 1991 Gulf 
                                                                                                                      
 333. Press Release, IAEA, Director General Briefs Press on Iran/DPRK (Mar. 5, 2007), 
available at http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2007/dg_iran-dprk.html (last visited Oct. 
6, 2009). 
 334. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing the destabilizing effects of 
perceived WMD threats). 
 335. See Blix, supra note 184, at 9–10.  
 336. S.C. Res. 1441, para. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1442 (Nov. 8, 2002). 
WAXMAN FTP 3_C.DOC 11/13/2009  9:18 AM 
74 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 31:1 
 
War—was automatically licensing the use force again.337 Also important, 
however, is the evidentiary notion this provision laid down: that informa-
tional gaps or distortions created by the suspected party will be 
interpreted against it.338 Such statements allowed Secretary Powell to de-
clare in his U.N. Security Council presentation that “[t]he Council 
placed the burden on Iraq to comply and disarm, and not on the inspec-
tors to find that which Iraq has gone out of its way to conceal for so 
long.”339 While not going so far as to say that failure to provide informa-
tion would give rise to negative inferences about hidden capabilities, the 
marker laid down in Resolution 1441 at least helped legitimate allocation 
of some risk of error to the breaching party by reference to a near-
universally respected mandate that overrides, by reason of the Security 
Council’s primacy, baseline sovereignty expectations. 
The case of Iran also shows how international legal processes—the 
U.N. Security Council and IAEA working in tandem—can help legiti-
mate evidentiary presumptions based on deliberate obfuscation. In that 
case it has occurred incrementally. In June 2003 the IAEA reported that 
Iran had failed to meet its Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations by failing 
to report on nuclear material, facilities, and activity.340 In its November 
2003 report, the IAEA took a half-step toward shifting the burden of per-
suasion regarding WMD allegations to Iran. While noting that “[t]o date, 
there is no evidence that the previously undeclared nuclear material and 
activities . . . were related to a nuclear weapons programme,” it went on 
to state that “given Iran’s past pattern of concealment, it will take some 
time before the Agency is able to conclude that Iran’s nuclear pro-
gramme is exclusively for peaceful purposes.”341 In other words, a body 
of forensic evidence that might otherwise be assessed in favor of the sub-
ject state would not be, in light of its prior practice of concealment. By 
2005, the IAEA declared that Iran’s history of concealment of nuclear 
activities, coupled with the IAEA’s lack of confidence in Iran’s claims of 
peaceful nuclear development intentions, raised issues of international 
peace and security appropriate for the U.N. Security Council.342  
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Recently the Security Council referral process was used to further 
build international expectations of disclosure and establish the proposi-
tion that Iran’s lack of cooperation posed dangerous risks to peace. In 
March 2006, the U.N. Security Council President called on Iran to take 
steps required by the IAEA’s resolutions.343 Then in December 2006 the 
U.N. Security Council passed a resolution expressing serious concern 
over the outstanding issues cited in many IAEA reports and resolutions, 
criticizing Iran’s incomplete cooperation.344 The March 2008 U.N. Secu-
rity Council resolution criticized Iran’s continued refusal to cooperate 
with the IAEA and outlined further steps to enforce previously author-
ized measures to restrict Iran’s access to nuclear program materials.345 
This chronology is typically thought of in terms of escalatory coer-
cive pressure, tightening the sanctions noose.346 Another way to view it, 
however, is laying the legal foundation for evidentiary burden-shifting 
through legal process.  
D. Embedded Policy Questions  
There is, of course, a danger in relying heavily on legal processes to 
strengthen adverse inferences from non-compliance: If failure to abide 
strictly by the disclosure terms of Non-Proliferation Treaty or other arms 
control conventions is used not merely to assert a breach of legal duty 
but as part of an evidentiary case to justify armed attack, potential prolif-
erators will have less incentive to sign on to them to begin with. The 
reliance on such inferences in one case may undermine longer-term ef-
forts to combat proliferation, although the relative risks depend in part 
on to what extent arms control and non-proliferation agreements them-
selves should be enforced through carrots or sticks.347  
More broadly, the use of force regulatory regime needs to be consid-
ered within a broader international legal context, including its overlap 
and interaction with the non-proliferation regulatory regime. Although 
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the frequency with which precautionary force is used to combat WMD 
proliferation will almost certainly remain very low, the arguments relied 
on to support it will influence other states’ behavior. A choice among 
evidentiary principles ought therefore to reflect a judgment whether 
WMD proliferation is best combated with coercive threats of military 
force, engagement through international arms control regimes, or a com-
bination thereof.  
As stated at the outset of this Part, evidentiary principles of interna-
tional law and use of force regulation will emerge, if at all, through a 
process of international legal discourse and argumentation, not a formal-
ized statement.348 One value of working through the evidentiary 
questions posed in this Part is to reveal the policy questions lying just 
below the surface of use-of-force debates. The standard of proof ques-
tion, for example, turns on how the relevant international actors aim to 
balance false positives and negatives. This is a matter of calibrating 
competing risks. The propensity inferences question turns on what con-
ditions or behavior by “bad” states should diminish the benefit of the 
doubt normally accorded to “good” states about activities that could sig-
nal WMD development. This is a matter of conditioning sovereign 
equality. And the burden-shifting question turns on how best to promote 
adherence to the non-proliferation regime. This is a matter of interna-
tional diplomatic strategy.  
The reasonable necessity approach helps bring these issues into fo-
cus, by demanding analysis of the substantive criteria that should guide 
legal uses of force, which in a world of capability uncertainty includes 
factual judgment criteria. The same policy questions, however, still per-
colate beneath the surface in the traditional view’s world. Deliberative 
processes like U.N. Security Council decisionmaking might force states 
to confront these questions, but they might not. The policy and epistemic 
challenges discussed in this paper are already sure to arise in the imme-
diate term with respect to Iran and North Korea. In the longer-term, as 
President Obama recently explained during his European diplomatic 
summit, the countries will continue to pose dire transnational security 
predicaments.349 Even if one ultimately concludes that the traditional 
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view approach is superior as to regulating force, the questions prompted 
through the reasonable necessity inquiry should produce more informed 
collective decisionmaking.  
Conclusion 
The purpose of this Article was to explore how international legal 
rules on the use of force should handle emergent and inescapable intelli-
gence gaps and uncertainties about adversary states’ WMD capabilities. 
It argues that a reasonable necessity approach to use of force against 
WMD threats—and with it an objective standard of assessing WMD ca-
pability—operating as a narrow exception to formal U.N. Security 
Council authorization best balances competing risks. However, it also 
argues that rather than viewing the process-oriented approach of the tra-
ditional view and the more fluid standards of the reasonable necessity 
approach as mutually exclusive, they can operate in tandem to reinforce 
each other. To do so effectively, greater attention must be paid to the evi-
dentiary issues explored in Part III.  
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